Lawyerly

GR No. 206020

2015-04-14

REYES, J.

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,[14] the Court struck down the COMELEC's prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile places." The Court ratiocinated that: Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.[15] (Emphases ours)

GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,[220] this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the freedom of expression especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage: We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.

GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech."[258] In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the tension in a way that protects the right of participation."[259]

GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC. This case was also an election protest case involving candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City.[41] Petitioners in Soriano, Jr. filed before this court a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division.[42] While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest case.[43] Soriano applied the general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however, acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.[44]

GR No. 203335

2014-02-18

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

ABAD, J.

In Blo Umpar Adiong v. COMELEC, [267] this court reiterated:A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).

GR No. 178552

2010-10-05

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

CARPIO MORALES, J.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58]

GR No. 164785

2010-03-15

ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

VELASCO JR., J.

Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to the exercise of his religious beliefs and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioner's position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make his statements was a television broadcast, which is accessible to children of virtually all ages. As already laid down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the interest of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioner's invectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The public soapbox that is television must be guarded by the state, which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioner's statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,[4] the freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which reaches every home where there is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid the basis for the classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, "It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young."[5]

GR No. 168338

2008-02-15

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES

PUNO, C.J.

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute,[42] nor is it an "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom."

GR NO. 169838

2006-04-25

BAYAN v. EDUARDO ERMITA

AZCUNA, J.

Adiong v. Comelec[8] held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them.

GR NO. 128959

2005-09-30

CIRIACO 'BOY' GUINGGUING v. CA

TINGA, J.

Particularly, this Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC,[66] the Court cited New York Times in noting that "[w]e have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."[67] The Court was even more explicit in its affirmation of New York Times in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals.[68] Speaking through Justice Mendoza:For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions.[[69]] This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.[70]

	GR No. 206020 2015-04-14	1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON v. COMELEC REYES, J.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,[14] the Court struck down the COMELEC's prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile places." The Court ratiocinated that: Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.[15] (Emphases ours)
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,[220] this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the freedom of expression especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage: We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech."[258] In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the tension in a way that protects the right of participation."[259]
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC. This case was also an election protest case involving candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City.[41] Petitioners in Soriano, Jr. filed before this court a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division.[42] While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest case.[43] Soriano applied the general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however, acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.[44]
	GR No. 203335 2014-02-18	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
In Blo Umpar Adiong v. COMELEC, [267] this court reiterated:A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).
	GR No. 178552 2010-10-05	SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL CARPIO MORALES, J.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58]
	GR No. 164785 2010-03-15	ELISEO F. SORIANO v. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA VELASCO JR., J.
Petitioner next harps on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to the exercise of his religious beliefs and profession, as presiding minister of his flock, over the right and duty of the state as parens patriae. Petitioner's position may be accorded some cogency, but for the fact that it fails to consider that the medium he used to make his statements was a television broadcast, which is accessible to children of virtually all ages. As already laid down in the Decision subject of this recourse, the interest of the government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioner's invectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry. The public soapbox that is television must be guarded by the state, which purpose the MTRCB serves, and has served, in suspending Ang Dating Daan for petitioner's statements. As emphasized in Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak,[4] the freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as regards television, which reaches every home where there is a set, and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs shown. The same case also laid the basis for the classification system of the MTRCB when it stated, "It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young."[5]
	GR No. 168338 2008-02-15	FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. RAUL M. GONZALES PUNO, C.J.
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute,[42] nor is it an "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom."
	GR NO. 169838 2006-04-25	BAYAN v. EDUARDO ERMITA AZCUNA, J.
Adiong v. Comelec[8] held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them.
	GR NO. 128959 2005-09-30	CIRIACO 'BOY' GUINGGUING v. CA TINGA, J.
Particularly, this Court has accepted the proposition that the actual malice standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases concerning public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC,[66] the Court cited New York Times in noting that "[w]e have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."[67] The Court was even more explicit in its affirmation of New York Times in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals.[68] Speaking through Justice Mendoza:For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions.[[69]] This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.[70]

BLO UMPAR ADIONG v. COMELEC