This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-12-09 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Although the RTC had the broad discretion in dealing with JPV's application for the writ of preliminary injunction, it was bound by the Court's exhortation against thereby prejudging the merits of the case in Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[19] | |||||
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2012-04-11 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,[23] or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31] | |||||
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2012-03-19 |
REYES, J. |
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| Lastly, the issues being linked to the parties' differing loan computations, which difference was found by the trial court as likely to cause the irreparable injury to the respondents, can only be reasonably determined after a trial on the merits. These issues include the effect of the loan proceeds' release in US dollars and the existence, authenticity or validity of the two promissory notes disputed by the respondents. In Searth Commodities Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held: The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. (Rivas v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 190 SCRA 295 [1990]; Government Service and Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 76 [1989]; and Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 165 [1988]) In the case at bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the sale of the properties premised on the aforementioned justification of the petitioners, the issuance of the writ would be a virtual acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void. (See Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, supra). There would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.[24] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2010-11-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela,[44] it was held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the issuing authority, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy that may be availed of only upon the grounds expressly provided by law.[45] In Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo[46] and Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[47] it was also held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the tribunal taking cognizance of the case, limited only by the requirement that the use of such discretion be based on ground and in the manner provided by law.[48] Bataclan v. Court of Appeals[49] also points out that although sufficient discretion is allowed in the grant of the relief, extreme caution must be taken in determining the necessity for the grant of the relief prayed for, because it would necessarily affect the protective rights of the parties in a case.[50] | |||||
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2007-10-15 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Furthermore, petitioners maintain that in issuing the injunctive writ, public respondent showed manifest bias and prejudice and prejudged the merits of the case in utter disregard of the caveat issued by this Court in Searth Commodities Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals[23] and Vera v. Arca.[24] | |||||
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2007-10-15 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| All told, while the grant or denial of an injunction generally rests on the sound discretion of the lower court, this Court may and should intervene in a clear case of abuse.[50] | |||||
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2007-02-19 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right;[59] and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.[60] | |||||