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CYNTHIA S. SANTIAGO v. PRESIDING JUDGE TEOFILO GUADIZ

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 212496 2015-03-18	NESTOR BRACERO v. RODULFO ARCELO LEONEN, J.
Respondent heirs contend that "[petitioner's] counsel did not categorically say that he was not informed by his client of the decision on the date of receipt on May 4, 2009."[53] Respondent heirs quote Santiago v. Guadiz, Jr.[54] in that "petitioners cannot invoke due process on the basis of feigned ignorance as lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice."[55]
	GR No. 212496 2015-03-18	NESTOR BRACERO v. RODULFO ARCELO LEONEN, J.
The petitioners also maintain that they should have first been furnished with a copy of the final decision before a writ of execution could be validly enforced against them. Formal service of the judgment is indeed necessary as a rule but not, as it happens, in the case at bar. The reason is that the petitioners had filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Judge Guadiz, which would indicate that they were then already informed of such decision. The petitioners cannot now invoke due process on the basis of a feigned ignorance as the lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice.[64]
	GR No. 183270 2009-02-13	RUFINA L. CALIWAN v. MARIO OCAMPO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.[24] It was conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases. Respect for the Rule on Summary Procedure as a practicable norm for the expeditious resolution of cases like the one at bar could have avoided lengthy litigation that has unduly imposed on the time of the Court.[25]
	GR No. 181568 2008-06-26	SPS. MANALO P. HERNAL v. SPS. PAULINO DE GUZMAN CORONA, J.
In Santiago v. Guadiz,[8] we held:Formal service of the judgment is indeed necessary as a rule but not, as it happens, in the case at bar. The reason is that the petitioners had filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Judge Guadiz, which would indicate that they were then already informed of such decision. The petitioners cannot now invoke due process on the basis of a feigned ignorance as the lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice. (Emphasis supplied) Be that as it may, the fact was that respondent spouses' counsel himself had actual notice of the first RTC resolution. This was evidenced by his act of filing the motion for reconsideration on May 8, 2003. Worthy of note was the fact that, in his motion, he stated: