This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2014-10-08 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Clearly, the claim that the sale was effected through "voidable and void documents" partakes merely of a conclusion of law that is not supported by any averment of circumstances that will show why or how such conclusion was arrived at. In fact, what these "voidable and void documents" are were not properly stated and/or identified. In Abad v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,[38] the Court pronounced that: A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.[39] (Emphases supplied) | |||||
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2009-04-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Therefore, an obligation imposed on a person, and the corresponding right granted to another, must be rooted in at least one of these five sources. The mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint or Petition, without identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact or conclusions of law.[10] Thus, a Complaint or Petition filed by a person claiming a right to the Office of the President of this Republic, but without stating the source of his purported right, cannot be said to have sufficiently stated a cause of action. Also, a person claiming to be the owner of a parcel of land cannot merely state that he has a right to the ownership thereof, but must likewise assert in the Complaint either a mode of acquisition of ownership or at least a certificate of title in his name. | |||||
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2004-01-14 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The petition at bar seeks to nullify, via a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before this Court, the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" by virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR with the authority to operate on-line Internet gambling. It is well settled that averments in the complaint, and not the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action.[5] Although the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent PAGCOR, what it primarily seeks to accomplish is to prevent the enforcement of the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming." Thus, the action may properly be characterized as one for Prohibition under Section 2 of Rule 65, which incidentally, is another remedy resorted to by petitioner. | |||||