This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-09-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| As to the RMO and BIR Rulings cited by petitioner, the Court is not bound by these administrative interpretations or rulings. As we have consistently ruled, interpretations placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, are not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous as the courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.[60] | |||||
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2012-04-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Moreover, petitioner's insistence that the case of Jariol v. IMS should be applied in the present case is untenable. Being a mere decision of the NLRC, it could not be considered as a precedent warranting its application in the case at bar. Suffice it to state that although Article 8 of the Civil Code[31] recognizes judicial decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of the country, such level of recognition is not afforded to administrative decisions.[32] | |||||
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2012-03-14 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| However, these administrative issuances or orders, though they enjoy the presumption of legalities, are still subject to the interpretation by the Supreme Court pursuant to its power to interpret the law. While rules and regulation issued by the administrative bodies have the force and effect of law and are entitled to great respect, courts interpret administrative regulations in harmony with the law that authorized them and avoid as much as possible any construction that would annul them as invalid exercise of legislative power.[14] | |||||
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2007-12-18 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| (1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; x x x (emphases supplied) We have held that RMCs are considered administrative rulings which are issued from time to time by the CIR.[30] | |||||
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2007-09-21 |
CORONA, J. |
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| In exercising its option, the corporation must signify in its annual corporate adjustment return (by marking the option box provided in the BIR form) its intention either to carry over the excess credit or to claim a refund. To facilitate tax collection, these remedies are in the alternative and the choice of one precludes the other.[20] | |||||
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2004-03-03 |
VITUG, J. |
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| Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that - "In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified." In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled - "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own." In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment: "Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class." Let us leave it at that for the moment. | |||||