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FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN v. FRANKLIN DRILON GABRIEL ZOSA

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

	GR No. 195956 2015-03-11	ABS-CBN CORPORATION v. FELIPE GOZON LEONEN, J.
The word "idea" is derived from a Greek term, meaning "a form, the look or appearance of a thing as opposed to its reality, from idein, to see." In the Timaeus, Plato saw ideas as eternal paradigms, independent objects to which the divine demiurge looks as patterns in forming the world. This was later modified to the religious conception of ideas as the thoughts of God. "It is not a very long step to extend the term 'idea' to cover patterns, blueprints, or plans in anyone's mind, not only in God's." The word entered the French and English vernacular in the 1600s and possessed two meanings. The first was the Platonic meaning of a perfect exemplar or paradigm. The second, which probably has its origin with Descartes, is of a mental concept or image or, more broadly, any object of the mind when it is active. Objects of thought may exist independently. The sun exists (probably) before and after you think of it. But it is also possible to think of things that have never existed, such as a unicorn or Pegasus. John Locke defined ideas very comprehensively, to include: all objects of the mind. Language was a way of translating the invisible, hidden ideas that make up a person's thoughts into the external, perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that others can understand.[86] (Citations omitted) There is no one legal definition of "idea" in this jurisdiction. The term "idea" is mentioned only once in the Intellectual Property Code.[87] In Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon,[88] a television format (i.e., a dating show format) is not copyrightable under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 49;[89] it is a mere concept:P.D. No. 49, §2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Thus, the new INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES provides:
	GR No. 195956 2015-03-11	ABS-CBN CORPORATION v. FELIPE GOZON LEONEN, J.
A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows[90] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Ideas can be either abstract or concrete.[91] It is the concrete ideas that are generally referred to as expression:The words "abstract" and "concrete" arise in many cases dealing with the idea/expression distinction. The Nichols court, for example, found that the defendant's film did not infringe the plaintiffs play because it was "too generalized an abstraction from what plaintiff wrote . . . only a part of her ideas." In Eichel v. Marcin, the court said that authors may exploit facts, experiences, field of thought, and general ideas found in another's work, "provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form, in which the circumstances and ideas have been developed, arranged, and put into shape." Judge Hand, in National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. said that "no one infringes, unless he descends so far into what is concrete as to invade. . . 'expression.'"
	GR No. 195956 2015-03-11	ABS-CBN CORPORATION v. FELIPE GOZON LEONEN, J.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by the statute. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.[128] The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum.[129] "An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial."[130]
	GR No. 184681 2013-02-25	GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
The prosecutor's call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the review of the Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors.[118] This much is clear in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:[119]
	GR No. 171536 2009-04-07	APRIL JOY ASETRE v. JUNEL ASETRE QUISUMBING, J.
In Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon,[30] this Court affirmed the DOJ Secretary's power of control over the authority of a state prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigations on criminal actions. Thus, we held:In reviewing resolutions of prosecutors, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from considering errors, although unassigned, for the purpose of determining whether there is probable cause for filing cases in court. He must make his own finding of probable cause and is not confined to the issues raised by the parties during preliminary investigation. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.[31]
	GR NO. 163255 2007-06-22	INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY v. MANUEL M. SERRANO PUNO, C.J.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHEN IT REFUSED TO FILE THE INFORMATION AGAINST RESPONDENT DESPITE THE PUBLICATION OF THE SUBJECT LIBELOUS NOTICE. The general rule is that the courts do not interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the specificity and adequacy of the averments in a criminal complaint.[10] The determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function[11] which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice.[12] The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[13] Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse.[14]
	GR NO. 161295 2005-06-29	JESSIE G. CHING v. WILLIAM M. SALINAS CALLEJO, SR., J.
No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration and the deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion. Indeed, in Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon[47] and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated,[48] the Court ruled that:Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by it. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description.
	GR No. 158543 2004-07-21	ROSALINDA PUNZALAN v. DENCIO DELA PEÑA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case of Samson, et al. v. Guingona[27] that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.[28]