This case has been cited 16 times or more.
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2016-01-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.[15] Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[16] Malice is bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel.[17] To determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.[18] Reckless disregard of what is false or not means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or possesses a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.[19] | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code[37] and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.[38] Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accused's defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. | |||||
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2014-02-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause[12] in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference. | |||||
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.[55] In the case of Lagon v. Court of Appeals,[56] we held that to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference cannot be justified. We further explained that the word "induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. As to the allegation of private respondent in said case that petitioner induced the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of the original lease contract with the deceased landowner, we ruled as follows: Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. x x x | |||||
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2009-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged communications. The enumeration under said article is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.[33] They are known as qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In other words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged communications enumerated above - (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest - may still be considered actionable if actual malice is proven. This is in contrast with absolutely privileged communications, wherein the imputations are not actionable, even if attended by actual malice: A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith.[34] | |||||
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2009-05-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."[19] Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious.[20] The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances: A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.[21] We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.[22] The rule on privileged communication had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete,[23] this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.[24] | |||||
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2008-09-16 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals.[24] In essence, he argues that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged communication" under Borjal and that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact. | |||||
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2008-04-22 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| Assuming that respondent, indeed, caused the publication of his complaint, he may not be held liable for damages for it. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest. This is explained by the Court in Borjal v. Court of Appeals,[85] to wit:To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.[86] (Citations omitted and underscoring ours) Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public officials but extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.[87] | |||||
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2008-03-28 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.[38] In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel should be upheld. | |||||
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2007-05-25 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.[5] Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons[6] laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article. | |||||
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2006-10-17 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.[16] . | |||||
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2005-12-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good? Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (citations omitted) The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of society and the orderly administration of government inevitably lead to the adoption of the doctrine of privileged communication. "A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong 'private communications' and 'fair and true report without any comments or remarks.'"[24] | |||||
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2005-09-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| For resolution of this Court, therefore, is the fundamental question of whether the publication subject matter of the instant case is indeed libelous. While the findings and conclusions of the lower courts are rigid in their application of the strict letter of the law, the issue seems more complex than it appears at first blush. The Court is compelled to delve deeper into the issue considering that libel principles formulated at one time or another have waxed and waned through the years, in the constant ebb and flow of judicial review.[24] A change in the factual milieu of a case is apt to evoke a change in the judgment applicable. Viewed in this context, the petition has merit and the judgment appealed from must be reversed. | |||||
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2005-03-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In the case, however, of Borjal v. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court recognized that the enumeration stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is not exclusive but is rendered more expansive by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, thus:. . . To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete [38 Phil. 253], this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.[33] | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In the case of Borjal v. Court of Appeals,[39] this Court declared that "[i]t is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication."[40] Plainly, private respondent has the bounden duty to present before the court evidence that a third person could easily identify him as the person libeled. In this case, private respondent has utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility. | |||||
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2003-01-28 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately preceeding paragraph. Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual[24] to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country.[25] It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs. | |||||