This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-04-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[26] | |||||
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2013-11-27 |
REYES, J. |
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| "[A] buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors."[23] Since Loks was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant did not make the arrest illegal.[24] Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court authorizes a warrantless arrest by a peace officer and even a private person "when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed or is attempting to commit an offense." The legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to validly search and seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense.[25] | |||||
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2013-10-09 |
REYES, J. |
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| "[A] buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors."[41] As in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[42] The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.[43] | |||||
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2012-10-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| However, We find these impositions contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. In the recent People v. Mantalaba,[37] where the accused was likewise 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the Court held, inter alia, that: (a) pursuant to Sec. 98 of RA 9165, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death when the offender is a minor; and (b) that the penalty should be graduated since the said provision adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.[38] The Court in the said case established the rules as follows: Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty. (Emphasis supplied.) | |||||
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2012-04-11 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant's contention is unmeritorious. It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the the law enforcers' failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero,[13] the Court noted that Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This Court consequently held that "this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible."[14] The same conclusion was reached by this Court in People v. Roa,[15] People v. Mantalaba[16] and People v. Sabadlab.[17] | |||||