This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-11-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| x x x the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there have been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and without ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.[81] It is true that the usual function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the execution of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.[82] The office of prohibition is to arrest proceedings rather than to undo them.[83] A preventive remedy, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.[84] | |||||
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2005-08-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity,"[39] we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction.[40] It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages;[41] "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."[42] | |||||
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2005-07-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity,"[39] we have consistently ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction.[40] It should only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages;[41] "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."[42] | |||||