This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2009-12-18 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that "[n]o elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law". In prior decisions, we have ruled that there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee.[21] Here, absent an express provision of law, the grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to double compensation from one single act of separation from employment. | |||||
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2009-03-25 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Obviously, the assailed resolution is not a "decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be.[25] The requirement is not applicable to a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration of the decision. What is applicable is the second paragraph of the above-quoted Constitutional provision referring to "motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court." The assailed resolution complied with the requirement therein that a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration should state the legal basis of the denial. It sufficiently explained that after reading the pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate court did not find any cogent reason to reverse itself. | |||||
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2004-11-10 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion."[17] Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner failed to clearly show that an appeal to the Office of the President was not the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, which would justify judicial intervention. | |||||