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CARMELITO N. VALENZONA v. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

2015-07-15
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In this case, despite the finding of fitness to work by the company­-designated physicians, the CA declared respondent entitled to permanent total disability benefits for failure of the former to declare the latter fit to work within the 120-day period provided under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, citing the ruling in the cases of Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corporation[32] (Valenzona) and Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina[33] (Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.) that declared a seafarer permanently disabled if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. Both Valenzona and Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. stemmed from the ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad[34] that characterized permanent disability as the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
2015-06-15
MENDOZA, J.
The Court has reiterated in many cases that total permanent disability means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[24]
2015-01-14
SERENO, C.J.
First, Montierro insists that the 120-day rule laid down in the 2005 case Crystal Shipping, and not the 240-day rule introduced by the 2008 case Vergara, applies to this case. Montierro cites the more recent cases Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., v. Tanawan,[25] Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Mesina,[26] and Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corp.,[27] all of which applied the Crystal Shipping doctrine despite the fact that they were promulgated after Vergara.
2014-11-19
MENDOZA, J.
In its May 30, 2013 Decision, the CA reversed the NLRC and sustained the LA award of permanent total disability benefits. The CA applied the 120-day Presumptive Disability Rule. It took note of the fact that Michael had exceeded the period within which he was initially considered on temporary total disability. The CA brushed aside the conclusion of the NLRC that the award of disability benefits was unjustified in the absence of disability grading. It stated that the absence of any grading at the onset of Michael's disability or absence of any assessment by Dr. Cruz that he was still unfit to work was of no moment, as disability should be understood more on the loss of earning capacity rather than on the medical significance of the disability. The CA cited the case of Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc.,[11] where even in the absence of an official finding by the company-designated physician that the seafarer suffered a disability and was unfit for sea duty, the seafarer may still be declared to be suffering from a permanent disability if he was unable to work for more than 120 days. It added that what clearly determined the seafarer's entitlement to permanent disability benefits was his inability to work for more than 120 days. It emphasized that in Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corporation (Valenzona),[12] the seafarer's disability was still considered permanent and total despite declaration by the company-designated physician of the seafarer's fitness to work as such declaration was made belatedly, that is, more than 120 days after repatriation. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
2014-03-03
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Regarding the issue of compensability, it has been the Court's consistent ruling that in disability compensation, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."[30] Moreover, "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-A[31] does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties."[32]
2012-08-29
BERSAMIN, J.
That the company-designated physician did not render any finding of disability is of no consequence. Disability should be understood more on the loss of earning capacity rather than on the medical significance of the disability.[36] Even in the absence of an official finding by the company- designated physician to the effect that the seafarer suffers a disability and is unfit for sea duty, the seafarer may still be declared to be suffering from a permanent disability if he is unable to work for more than 120 days.[37] What clearly determines the seafarer's entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120 days.[38] Although the company- designated physician already declared the seafarer fit to work, the seafarer's disability is still considered permanent and total if such declaration is made belatedly (that is, more than 120 days after repatriation).[39]
2012-08-15
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Entitlement of seafarers to disability benefits is governed not only by medical findings but also by contract and by law.[41] By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000, of the Department of Labor and Employment (POEA SEC) and the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement bind the seafarer and the employer.[42] By law, the Labor Code provisions on disability apply with equal force to seafarers.[43]
2011-11-23
MENDOZA, J.
The Court is more inclined to rule, however, that respondent is suffering from a permanent total disability as he was unable to return to his job that he was trained to do for more than one hundred twenty days already.  The recent case of Valenzona v. Fair Shipping Corporation, et al.,[31] citing Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,[32]  elucidated the concept of permanent total disability, in this wise: Thus, Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. x x x