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CONCEPCION MAGSAYSAY-LABRADOR v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 173297 2013-03-06	STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY v. TOMAS CUENCA BERSAMIN, J.
The Cuencas and Tayactac were clearly not vested with any direct interest in the personal properties coming under the levy on attachment by virtue alone of their being stockholders in Arc Cuisine, Inc. Their stockholdings represented only their proportionate or aliquot interest in the properties of the corporation, but did not vest in them any legal right or title to any specific properties of the corporation. Without doubt, Arc Cuisine, Inc. remained the owner as a distinct legal person.[43]
	GR No. 153690 2011-02-15	DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM CARPIO MORALES, J.
On proposed Section 3(4), Commissioner Natividad asked what the effect would be of a decision that violates the proviso that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court en banc." The answer given was that such a decision would be invalid. Following up, Father Bernas asked whether the decision, if not challenged, could become final and binding at least on the parties. Romulo answered that, since such a decision would be in excess of jurisdiction, the decision on the case could be reopened anytime.[14] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
	GR No. 175573 2008-09-11	OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. JOEL S. SAMANIEGO CORONA, J.
The legal interest must be actual and material, direct and immediate.[30] In Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA,[31] the interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit:[m]ust be on the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. The words "an interest in the subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded and which would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover. The CA denied petitioner's motion for intervention for lack of basis, reasoning that:
	GR No. 169914 2008-03-24	ASIA’S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION CORONA, J.
The scenario here is similar to the intervention sought in Magsaysay-Labrador v. CA.[7] In that case, Rodriguez-Magsaysay filed an action against Subic Land Corporation (SLC) et al. She alleged that her husband, the late Senator Genaro Magsaysay, assigned land (which was part of their conjugal property) to SLC. She prayed that this assignment be annulled. Magsaysay-Labrador et al., the sisters of the late senator, filed a motion for intervention on the ground that their brother had already conveyed to them his shareholdings in SLC amounting to 41% of its total capital. They argued that as transferees of the shares, they had a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The Court disagreed:Here, the interest, if it exists at all, of petitioners-movants is indirect, contingent, remote, conjectural, consequential and collateral. At the very least, their interest is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right in the management of the corporation and to share in the profits thereof and in the properties and assets thereof on dissolution, after payment of the corporate debts and obligations.
	P.E.T. CASE NO. 002 2005-03-29	RONALD ALLAN POE v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO QUISUMBING, J.
Indeed the personal aspect of the case is inextricably linked with the public interest. For an election protest involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with public interest which raises it into a plane over and above ordinary civil actions.[17] But herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, has overly stressed that it is with the "paramount public interest" in mind that she desires "to pursue the process" commenced by her late husband. She avers that she is "pursuing the process" to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people. We laud her noble intention and her interest to find out the true will of the electorate. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court[18] is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsel's manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no interest in assuming the position as she is aware that she cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law.[19] It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.