This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2015-07-29 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| In the case at bar, the infractions of Raza were numerous enough that they already amount to an unlawful taking of company resources and that they may be subsumed under the charge of serious misconduct leveled against him.[64] It has been held that “although as a rule this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment or to mitigate the penalties imposed on them, acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property are a different matter.”[65] Such may be penalized with dismissal.[66] It matters little that Raza claims that his record prior to this was clean or that he has yet to cause substantial damage to the company or to its property in committing his acts. His transgressions are too serious and too many to escape without heavy sanction. In the present situation wherein Raza has already been found guilty of numerous acts of driving the company vehicle for his personal use without prior authority, the Court cannot expect and require the employer company to wait for one more such instance of unauthorized use or for actual damage to be caused by such use before the company can be considered justified in penalizing the erring employee.[67] This Court has held that a series of irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct, which is a just cause for termination.[68] In the case at bar, the seriousness and volume of the prior incidents, committed in such a short period of time, are already enough as ground to terminate petitioner. | |||||
|
2007-03-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission,[39] the Court disregarded the fact that it was the employee's first offense, as well as other mitigating circumstances, when it validated the dismissal of the employee. It reiterated the ruling in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of the Philippines v. Lariosa[40] that, "Although as a rule this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment or to mitigate the penalty imposed on them, acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property are a different matter." Thus, Gonzales' attempt to make a profit for himself out of cheating his employer cannot be mitigated by the fact that it was his first offense, or even his six years of service. The case of International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. Leogardo,[41] gives a good reason for the seemingly harsh rule:The dismissal of a dishonest employee is as much in the interests of labor as it is of management. The labor force in any company is protected and the workers' security of tenure strengthened when pilferage of equipment, goods, and products which endangers the viability of an employer and, therefore, the workers' continued employment is minimized or eliminated and consequently labor-management relations based on mutual trust and confidence are promoted. | |||||
|
2000-01-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
||||
| While petitioner acknowledges that "procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party,"[7] she contends that efficiency and order should not be the system's primordial values, taking over the places on the pedestal once occupied by justice and equity. To fortify her stand, she invokes the judicial policy of allowing appeals, although filed late, when the interest of substantial justice so requires. She cites Firestone and Rubber Co. of the Phils. v. Lariosa[8] where this Court overlooked the late filing of appeal because the Notice of Decision received by the employee's counsel advised him that the appeal could be filed within ten (10) "working" days which should properly have been ten (10) "calendar" days. In that case we discarded the stringent rule on the perfection of appeal in view of the sheer absence of any culpability on the part of respondent's counsel. The procedural lapse was solely attributable to his mistaken reliance on the notice which wrongly interpreted the ten (10) day reglementary period. Again in City Fair Corporation v. NLRC[9] where the NLRC was brought to task for allowing the appeal of the employees filed a day late, we ruled that a greater injustice would occur if appeal was not given due course than when the reglementary period to appeal was to be strictly followed. | |||||