This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2003-10-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Since the question of possession of the subject property is at the core of the two actions, it can be said that the parties in the instant petition are actually litigating over the same subject matter, which is the leased site, and on the same issue - respondent's right of possession by virtue of the alleged contract. As similarly observed in Arceo v. Olivares, [24] the only difference between the two cases herein is that respondent asserts, as a cause of action, its alleged contractual right to possession of the property in the RTC case, while the same matter is set forth as its counterclaim in the MeTC case where it is a defendant. However, the two cases are identical in all other respects, with merely a reversal of the parties' position in the two actions. | |||||
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2003-05-05 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| What could be barred by litis pendentia are the rentals which were due and demandable at the time of the filing of petitioner's answer, since they could be pleaded as counterclaims. It has been held that lis pendens may also be interposed even if the claim is set forth by way of a counterclaim, since the latter partakes of the nature of a complaint by the defendant against the plaintiff. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again advance the same in a complaint against the same party would be violative of the rule against splitting a cause of action.[24] However, petitioner's claims of back rentals after its filing of an answer with counterclaim in the first case constituted distinct causes of action and cannot be barred by litis pendentia. | |||||