This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2012-08-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners' complaint by virtue of the case being then still pending or undetermined at the time of the law's passage, there being no vested rights in rules of procedure.[11] They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their appeal. A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and unappealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be impaired.[12] Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved.[13] This is why we consistently hold that the right to appeal is statutory in character, and is available only if granted by law or statute.[14] | |||||