You're currently signed in as:
User

LA CHEMISE LACOSTE v. OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

2012-04-18
MENDOZA, J.
From the preceding citations, the appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute "doing business" unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation.  On the other hand, if the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines.[14]  It should be kept in mind that the determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines must be judged in light of the attendant circumstances.[15]
2006-11-30
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
At this juncture, it is paramount to stress that the power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function.[7] And inherent in the courts' power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued.[8] After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists.[9] Though there is no fixed rule for the determination of the existence of probable cause since the existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,[10] however, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.[11]
2005-06-29
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,[35] a case akin to the present dispute, as it involved the crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against manufacturers of garments bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.  If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State.  It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case.  We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
2003-01-28
BELLOSILLO, J.
The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case,[15] a person had allegedly committed libel against all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. In an English case, where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the Court considered that if the libel were on the whole Roman Catholic Church generally, then the defendant must be absolved.[16] With regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie.
2002-09-24
PANGANIBAN, J.
issuance of the subject bail orders.'"[14] In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are