This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2015-09-02 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims of ownership thereof, cannot be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment suit.[7] The issues involved in such a controversy should be fully threshed out in an action like accion reivindicatoria,[8] especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual prior possession. In a much earlier ruling of this Court, it was already held therein that "[i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry."[9] | |||||
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2014-12-03 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, [43] "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant's act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter."[44] | |||||
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2014-09-24 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.[11] In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1[12] of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[13] Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.[14] | |||||
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2014-09-24 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.[11] In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1[12] of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.[13] Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.[14] | |||||
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2014-09-17 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Personal service of pleadings is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service is the exception, so that where personal service is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service is mandatory.[19] Only when personal service is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. Based on this explanation will the court then determine whether personal service is indeed not practicable so that resort to other modes is made.[20] At this stage, the judge exercises proper discretion but only upon the explanation given. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, the court shall consider not only the circumstances, the time and the place but also the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading involved.[21] | |||||
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2014-03-17 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Even assuming that a photocopy of competent evidence of identity was indeed required, non-attachment thereof would not render the petition fatally defective. It has been consistently held[17] that verification is merely a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, affecting merely the form of the pleading such that non-compliance therewith does not render the pleading fatally defective. It is simply intended to provide an assurance that the allegations are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may in fact order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or it may act on the pleading although it may not have been verified, where it is made evident that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed so that the ends of justice may be served. The Court, in Altres v. Empleo,[18] issued guidelines based on previous jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of a defective, verification as well as on certification against forum shopping, as follows: x x x | |||||
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2013-03-20 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of its cause.[26] "Adventitious resort to technicality resulting in the dismissal of cases is disfavored because litigations must as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities."[27] Inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice to its refiling as in this case, merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of a clear intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the case before the court.[28] | |||||
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2012-11-12 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Petitioner never alleged that he had any agreement with the landowner of the subject property. Indeed Ladano's Complaint did not assert any right that arises from agrarian laws. He asserted his rights based on his prior physical possession of the two-hectare property and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The issues that he wanted resolved are who between himself and the respondents have a better right to possess the property, and whether he has a right to be compensated for the improvements he introduced on the property. Clearly, the nature of the case he filed is one for forcible entry[72] and for indemnification,[73] neither of which is cognizable by the DARAB, but by the regular courts. While neither of the parties challenged the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court can consider the issue of jurisdiction motu proprio.[74] | |||||
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2012-10-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6.[14] Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allows for such liberality.[15] | |||||