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PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN v. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

2006-09-07
TINGA, J.
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,[40] abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,[41] cohabited with a married woman,[42] lured an innocent woman into marriage,[43] or was found to be a womanizer.[44] The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.[45] In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[46] respondent was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,[47] where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
2004-09-22
PER CURIAM
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[30] we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child.  Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[31] we ruled that abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
2004-09-15
PER CURIAM
(6)  In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed cohabitation with his former paramour.  Here, we ruled that "abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married woman," constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
2003-08-14
BELLOSILLO, J.
By interpreting these broad terms to apply to the employee's performance on the job, the decisions x x x give content to language which otherwise would be too sweeping to be meaningful. Terms such as "immoral or unprofessional conduct" or "moral turpitude" stretch over so wide a range that they embrace an unlimited area of conduct. In using them the Legislature surely did not mean to endow the employing agency with the power to dismiss any employee whose personal, private conduct incurred its disapproval. Hence the courts have consistently related the terms to the issue of whether, when applied to the performance of the employee on the job, the employee has disqualified himself.[12] This understanding is crucial because our jurisprudence defines disgraceful and immoral conduct as "that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community,"[13] none of which is true in this case, and the Constitution recognizes our multi-cultural experience and decrees a principle of unity in diversity. As the definition poignantly suggests, a charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct does not depend solely upon the character of the protested act or series of acts but must include a holistic evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in each case.[14]
2003-08-04
PUNO, J.
Undersigned submits to the just, humane and fair discretion of the Court with verification from the WATCH TOWER BIBLE and TRACT SOCIETY, Philippine Branch . . . to which undersigned believes to be a high authority in relation to her case.[13] Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended that the case be referred to Executive Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas City for investigation, report and recommendation. In the course of Judge Maceda's investigation, Escritor again testified that her congregation allows her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio and it does not consider it immoral. She offered to supply the investigating judge some clippings which explain the basis of her congregation's belief and practice regarding her conjugal arrangement. Escritor started living with Quilapio twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She met this woman who confirmed to her that she was living with her (Escritor's) husband.[14]