This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-06-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Generally, a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint and in order to sustain a dismissal based on lack of cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint.[10] However, this rule is not without exception. Thus, a motion to dismiss "does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded."[11] Indeed, in some cases, the court may also consider, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties and the annexes or documents appended to it.[12] | |||||
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2009-01-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The factual allegations in respondents' complaint should be considered in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents attached to it as annexes or integral parts. In a number of cases, the Court held that in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties should be considered in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[32] Likewise, other facts not alleged in the complaint may be considered where the motion to dismiss was heard with the submission of evidence, or if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation discloses facts sufficient to defeat the claim.[33] For while the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded.[34] | |||||
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2008-07-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine.[56] Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires.[57] The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural resources.[58] Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non- impairment clauses of the Constitution.[59] In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State.[60] Such a privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance.[61] | |||||