This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2010-03-18 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| 4) the retraction of 5 union members should not be given any credence for the reasons that: (a) the sworn statements of the five retracting union members sans other affirmative evidence presented hardly qualify as clear and credible evidence considering the joint affidavits of the other members attesting to the orderly conduct of the organizational meeting; (b) the retracting members did not deny signing the union documents; (c) following, Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja[15] and Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[16] it can be presumed that "duress, coercion or valuable consideration" was brought to bear on the retracting members; and (d) citing La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations,[17] Belyca Corporation and Oriental Tin Can Labor Union, where the Court ruled that "once the required percentage requirement has been reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect the petition," it asserted the applicability of said ruling as the petition for certification election was filed on January 10, 2006 or long before February 15, 2006 when the affidavits of retraction were executed by the five union members, thus contending that the retractions do not affect nor be deemed compelling enough to cancel its certificate of registration. | |||||
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2003-04-01 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:… This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punished to be deprived of his liberty shall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the offender's title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offender the right to punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. …[41] | |||||