This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-12-09 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court.[30] A final order is appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1,[31] Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) declaring that "[a]n appeal may be taken from a judgment or fmal order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable."[32] | |||||
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2014-12-10 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In any case, We cannot also subscribe to respondent's view that the approval of the MRP is merely an interlocutory order. In Alma Jose v. Javellana,[40] We have already defined a final order as one that puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order.[41] Here, it cannot be gainsaid that the Resolution approving the MRP is a final order with respect to the validity thereof, specifically on the following issues: (1) the suspension of the tuition support; (2) conversion of Philippine Peso entitlements to U.S. Dollar entitlements; and (3) the payments in U.S. Dollars upon maturity in 2010. In this regard, the issue as to its alleged infringement on the non-impairment clause under the Constitution has likewise been settled. The doctrine laid down in New Frontier Sugar Corp. v. Regional Trial Court Branch 39, Iloilo City,[42] cannot be used to counter the foregoing because in that case, the Court merely stressed that an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.[43] New Frontier does not categorically preclude the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 for decisions or orders issued after the approval of the rehabilitation plan such as a modification thereof. | |||||
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2014-03-03 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41 prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does "not completely dispose of the case [because it leaves to the court] something else to be decided upon."[44] Appeals from interlocutory orders are generally prohibited to prevent delay in the administration of justice and to prevent "undue burden upon the courts."[45] | |||||
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2013-12-09 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Records, however, disclose that while De Guzman filed on June 10, 2005 a notice of appeal[41] to the PPC Board and subsequently appealed the latter's ruling to the CSC on July 26, 2006, these were all after he challenged the PPC Resolution dated November 23, 2004 (wherein he was adjudged guilty of the charges against him and consequently dismissed from the service) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88891). That the subject of De Guzman's appeal to the Board was not the Resolution dated November 23, 2004 but the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration of the first-mentioned resolution is of no moment. In Alma Jose v. Javellana,[42] the Court ruled that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself.[43] Thus, finding no cogent explanation on De Guzman's end or any justifiable reason for his premature resort to a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to adhere to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies which should have warranted the dismissal of said petition. | |||||