This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-07-10 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Undue injury means actual damage.[83] It must be established by evidence[84] and must have been caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders.[85] On the other hand, unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference means giving a gain of any kind without justification or adequate reasons.[86] | |||||
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2012-06-18 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."[21] In Uriarte v. People,[22] this Court explained that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[23] | |||||
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2009-02-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."[20] In Uriarte v. People,[21] this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.[22] "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[23] "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[24] "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[25] | |||||
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2001-11-19 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted. | |||||
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2000-05-12 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| By analogy, Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[22] finds application in the instant case. There, petitioners claimed that the Information charged the accused with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) the giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) the giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions; and thus moved for the quashal of the Information. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash and held that the phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" merely described the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, as amended, could be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information did not mean that the indictment charged three (3) distinct offenses. | |||||