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METROPOLITAN BANK v. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III

This case has been cited 3 times or more.

	GR No. 182130 2013-06-19	IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO v. CA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In the case of Callo-Caridad v. Esteban,[68] citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Tobias III, [69] the Court held: In reviewing the findings of the [public prosecutor] on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.
	GR No. 191567 2013-03-20	MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN BERSAMIN, J.
On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justice's determination of probable cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.[14] But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III: [15]
	GR No. 195198 2013-02-11	LORELI LIM PO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REYES, J.
Again, even if we were to take exception of Chiu's case by giving due course to his petition either under Rule 45 or Rule 65, still, the result is its dismissal. In Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III,[26] we stated that: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. x x x.