This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2008-10-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We have said that it is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person.[14] Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered.[15] Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted.[16] In the instant case, while it is possible that the accused has committed the crime, there is also the possibility, based on the evidence presented, that he has not. He should be deemed to have not for failure to meet the test of moral certainty. Finally, an accused should not be convicted by reason of the weakness of his alibi. It is fundamental that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[17] Since there are very serious doubts in the testimony of the lone eyewitness to the killing of Mark Santos, we have no choice but to acquit petitioner Angel Ubales on the ground of reasonable doubt. | |||||
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2007-05-21 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness."[5] The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects."[6] It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other's testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."[7] | |||||
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2003-05-06 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We do not have to be confused regarding the nature of the lands yet to be reclaimed. They are the same as the Freedom Islands. Both are meant to serve legitimate commercial ends, hence, lands of the private domain intended by both the executive and legislative branches of government to be used as commercial assets. This objective is obvious from PD 1084 which empowers PEA to "enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every class and description, including loan agreements, mortgages and other types of security arrangements, necessary or incidental to the realization of its purposes with any person, firm or corporation, private or public, and with any foreign government or entity." Executive Order No. 525 (1979)[37] provides that "[a]ll lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084." Finally, EO 654 (1981)[38] mandates that "[i]n the disposition of its assets and properties, the Authority shall have the authority to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer thereof to any third party." Since the principal task of PEA is to reclaim lands or to approve the execution of it by others, its power to contract must necessarily involve dealings with the reclaimed lands. | |||||