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SPS. EMILIO ABINUJAR AND MILAGROS M. LANA v. CA AND SPS. SANTIAGO RAMIRO AND FLORENTINA RAMIRO

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 178312 2013-01-30	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SPS. JORJA RIGOR-SORIANO AND MAGIN SORIANO BERSAMIN, J.
There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment.[15] The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.[16]
	GR No. 183387 2009-09-29	SIMEON M. VALDEZ v. FINANCIERA MANILA PERALTA, J.
The stipulation states categorically that the 30 investment accounts of respondent Financiera with SPPI had already matured. However, the cash value of the said investment accounts were never given because SPPI, not being a party to the Compromise Agreement, could not be compelled to pay respondent Financiera's unpaid obligation to petitioner Valdez. The only legal effect of the non-inclusion of a party in a compromise agreement is that said party cannot be bound by the terms of the agreement.[45] Thus, the valuable consideration referred to by respondent Financiera in the Compromise Agreement has yet to be fulfilled. The very essence of the stipulation, as gleaned from the literal, as well as the implied, meaning of the words contained therein is the eventual payment of petitioner Valdez's claim. As ruled[46] by this Court, in a compromise agreement, the literal meaning of its stipulations must control.[47] It "must be strictly interpreted and x x x understood as including only matters specifically determined therein or which, by necessary inference from its wording, must be deemed included."[48] Therefore, the non-maturity of the 30 investment accounts of respondent Financiera with SPPI makes the Compromise Agreement unenforceable. In Abinujar v. Court of Appeals,[49] as cited in Alonzo, et al. v. Jaime and Perlita San Juan,[50] this Court even went further and declared that the non-fulfillment of the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement approved by the court justifies execution thereof, and the issuance of a writ for the said purpose is the court's ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. In this particular case, since the Compromise Agreement's enforceability depends on the maturity of the subject SPPI shares, the RTC could not compel SPPI to deliver the cash value of the said investment accounts, simply because the latter was not a party to the Compromise Agreement. Hence, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it granted petitioner Valdez's motion for execution in its Decision dated May 22, 2000.
	GR NO. 169747 2007-07-27	BAN HUA U. FLOREZ v. UBS MARKETING CORPORATION GARCIA, J.
So Ordered. [25] (Italization and emphasis in the original.) In net effect, then, the SEC en banc, pursuant to its July 17, 2002 Order, strayed from and varied the final and executory disposition in SEC- AC No. 520 (SEC Case No. 3328), which, needless to stress, is embodied in its December 21, 1995 Order, as modified by its June 24, 1996 Resolution. The July 17, 2002 is a nullity, therefore. It cannot be overemphasized that a judgment is the foundation of an order of execution. Accordingly, an execution must conform to and be warranted by the judgment on which it was issued.[26] Execution is void if it does not strictly conform with every essential particular of the judgment rendered.[27]
	GR NO. 149696 2006-07-14	CARDINAL BUILDING OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. ASSET RECOVERY SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
There is nothing in the above provisions which authorizes the RTC, Branch 4, Manila to issue a writ of possession over the two condominium units in favor of petitioner. As we held in Abinujar v. Court of Appeals:[17]
	GR NO. 149696 2006-07-14	CARDINAL BUILDING OWNERS ASSOCIATION v. ASSET RECOVERY SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
There is nothing in the above provisions which authorizes the RTC, Branch 4, Manila to issue a writ of possession over the two condominium units in favor of petitioner. As we held in Abinujar v. Court of Appeals:[17]
	GR NO. 137549 2005-02-11	AURELIO P. ALONZO v. JAIME CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Abinujar v. Court of Appeals,[56] this Court even went further and declared that the nonfulfillment of the terms and conditions of a Compromise Agreement approved by the court justifies execution thereof and the issuance of the writ for the said purpose is the court's ministerial duty enforceable by Mandamus.