This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2011-05-30 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office.[25] Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic services"[26] when he barred the Darongs' access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before petitioner[27] and his resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence. | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In addition, appellant's claim that he only intended to hit the shoulders of the victim[36] and his insistence that the victim got mad at him when he demanded payment for his services[37] do not serve to mitigate his liability. The mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed[38] and that sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act,[39] find no application to the case at bar. In the first place, the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated in cases of murder qualified by treachery.[40] Moreover, the reply of the victim, "Problema mo 'yan, hindi ko problema yan," can hardly be considered a sufficient provocation to warrant the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance.As a result of the foregoing finding, and as conceded by appellant,[41] it would be unnecessary to discuss the second issue, as the imposable penalty would not change even if this Court were to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As correctly observed by the CA:Be that as it may, whether or not We appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is already immaterial as its existence, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, does not warrant modification of the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides: | |||||