You're currently signed in as:
User

BITOY JAVIER v. FLY ACE CORPORATION

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

2015-10-07
PERALTA, J.
Applying the foregoing criteria, Albia cannot be considered as in independent contractor. There is no dispute that it was Convoy who engaged the services of Albia as a driver without the intervention of a third party, paid his wages on a per trip basis, and abruptly terminated his services the next day after admitting to have consumed three bottles of beer after finishing his deliveries on July 22, 2004. There is, likewise, no question that Convoy controls or has reserved its right to control Albia's conduct, not only as to the result of his work but also as to the means and methods by which such result is to be accomplished.[22] This is evident from the following express provisions of the Deliver Agency Agreements (For Driver)[23] executed between Convoy and Albia: 1. The truck/s being driven by Albia belongs to Convoy;
2015-06-17
PERALTA, J.
As a final point, it bears to reiterate that while the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor.[43] Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.[44] Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer.[45] Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.[46]
2014-09-22
PERALTA, J.
The issue of Villegas' alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between him and Gamboa; thus, essentially a question of fact. Generally, the Court does not review errors that raise factual questions. However, when there is conflict among the factual findings of the antecedent deciding bodies like the LA, the NLRC and the CA, "it is proper, in the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction, to review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings."[13]
2014-07-28
DEL CASTILLO, J.
As the party claiming the existence of employer-employee relationship, it behoved upon Alcantara to prove the elements thereof, particularly Royale Homes' power of control over the means and methods of accomplishing the work.[38]  He, however, failed to cite specific rules, regulations or codes of ethics that supposedly imposed control on his means and methods of soliciting sales and dealing with prospective clients.  On the other hand, this case is replete with instances that negate the element of control and the existence of employer-employee relationship.  Notably, Alcantara was not required to observe definite working hours.[39]  Except for soliciting sales, Royale Homes did not assign other tasks to him.  He had full control over the means and methods of accomplishing his tasks as he can "solicit sales at any time and by any manner which [he may] deem appropriate and necessary."  He performed his tasks on his own account free from the control and direction of Royale Homes in all matters connected therewith, except as to the results thereof.[40]
2014-06-16
BERSAMIN, J.
We start by observing that the degree of proof required in labor cases is not as stringent as in other types of cases.[36] This liberal approach affords to the employee every opportunity to level the playing field in which her employer is pitted against her. Here, on the one hand, were Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit indicating that MMPI's revenues in 1999 totaled P36,216,624.07, and, on the other, the audit report showing MMPI's gross revenues amounting to only P31,947,677.00 in the same year. That the audit report was rendered by the auditing firm of Punongbayan & Araullo did not make it weightier than Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit, for only substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion[37] - was required in labor adjudication. Moreover, whenever the evidence presented by the employer and that by the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the latter.[38] For purposes of determining whether or not the petitioners' gross revenue reached the minimum target of P35 million, therefore, Tabingo's memorandum and affidavit sufficed to positively establish that it did, particularly considering that Tabingo's memorandum was made in the course of the performance of her official tasks as a traffic clerk of MMPI. In her affidavit, too, Tabingo asserted that her issuance of the memorandum was pursuant to MMPI's year-end procedures, an assertion that the petitioners did not refute. In any event, Tabingo's categorical declaration in her affidavit that "[because] of that achievement, as part of the Sales and Traffic Team of MMPI, in addition to my other bonuses that year, I received P8,500.00 in gift certificates as my share in the Group Incentive for the Sales and Traffic Team for gross advertising revenue of P35 to P38 million xxx,"[39] aside from the petitioners not refuting it, was corroborated by the 1999 Advertising Target sent by the respondent to Yap on December 2, 1999, in which the respondent reported a gross revenue of P36,216,624.07 as of December 1, 1999.[40]
2014-06-09
DEL CASTILLO, J.
As a general rule, the Court does not review errors that raise factual questions.[41] Nonetheless, while it is true that the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship existed between the parties basically involves a question of fact, the conflicting findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on one hand, and of the CA on the other, constrains the Court to review and re-evaluate such factual findings.[42]
2014-06-04
PERALTA, J.
Time and again, we have upheld that the substantiality of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects,[36]as in the present case where the affidavits on which the decision was mainly anchored were corroborated by any other documentary evidence such as the police blotter.
2014-03-19
BRION, J.
While the Court is not a trier of facts,[23]  we deem it proper to inquire into the facts of the present dispute to determine if any grave abuse of discretion intervened  when the CA reversed the NLRC's appreciation of evidence.[24]  The labor tribunals found Ruizo to have abandoned his treatment with Dr. Cruz and, for this reason, they denied his claim for disability benefits, there being no assessment of his disability from Dr. Cruz.  The CA, on the other hand, found that Ruizo was permanently and totally disabled because he was unable to work as a seafarer for more than 120 days and should be paid the corresponding disability benefits under the parties' CBA, the unsigned one-page excerpt of which (presented by Ruizo to the LA) it admitted in evidence, but which was considered by the LA and the NLRC to have no probative value.
2013-10-17
REYES, J.
Third, besides the employment agreement, McBurnie failed to present other competent evidence to prove his claim of an employer-employee relationship. Given the parties' conflicting claims on their true intention in executing the agreement, it was necessary to resort to the established criteria for the determination of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct.[125] The rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on the claimant to establish or substantiate the claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto.[126] McBurnie failed in this regard. As previously observed by the NLRC, McBurnie even failed to show through any document such as payslips or vouchers that his salaries during the time that he allegedly worked for the respondents were paid by the company. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between McBurnie and the respondents, McBurnie could not successfully claim that he was dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, by the latter. Even granting that there was such an employer-employee relationship, the records are barren of any document showing that its termination was by the respondents' dismissal of McBurnie.
2012-12-05
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or destroy management.[22] While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.[23]  Thus, where management prerogative to transfer employees is validly exercised, as in this case, courts will decline to interfere.
2012-09-19
MENDOZA, J.
At the outset, it should be stressed that a determination of the applicability of the doctrine of strained relations is essentially a factual question and, thus, not a proper subject in this petition.[17] This rule, however, admits of exceptions. In cases where the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting, the Court, in the exercise of Its equity jurisdiction, may review and re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings.[18]