This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-09-17 |
REYES, J. |
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| It bears emphasis that the CA did not nullify the ruling of the NLRC upon a finding that Libang's illnesses were pre-existing or not work-related. The appellate court's annulment of the NLRC decision was based on an entirely different basis that pertained to proof of disability. Given these circumstances, the Court will no longer disturb these factual findings that Libang's illnesses were work-related and acquired only during the course of his employment in M/V Baltimar Orion. Settled is the rule that only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review on certiorari, and the question of whether or not a particular illness is pre-existing and work-related raises essentially factual issues. The Court is not a trier of facts. If factual findings of the LA and the NLRC have been affirmed by the CA, the Court accords them the respect and finality they deserve.[37] | |||||
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2013-08-07 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The Court recognizes that "[t]he finality of the NLRC's [D]ecision does not preclude the filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. That the NLRC issues an entry of judgment after the lapse of ten (10) days from the parties' receipt of its [D]ecision will only give rise to the prevailing party's right to move for the execution thereof but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations."[24] However, it is a well-established rule that "a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari x x x. The rationale for the rule is | |||||
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2013-03-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Thus, petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his six-months employment contract, or equivalent to four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and benefit package. These benefits were guaranteed to be paid on a monthly basis, and were not made contingent. In fact, their monetary equivalent was fixed under the contract: US$2,500.00 for vacation leave pay and US$700.00 for tonnage bonus each month. Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salaries of US$32,800 (or US$5,000 + US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4 months). "Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee's full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent."[27] As we have time and again held, "[i]t is the obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed and had not stopped working."[28] This well-defined principle has likewise been lost on the CA in the consideration of the case. | |||||
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2013-03-13 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| A corporation is an artificial entity created by operation of law. It possesses the right of succession and such powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.[37] It has a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of other corporations to which it may be connected.[38] As a consequence of its status as a distinct legal entity and as a result of a conscious policy decision to promote capital formation,[39] a corporation incurs its own liabilities and is legally responsible for payment of its obligations.[40] In other words, by virtue of the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the corporate debt or credit is not the debt or credit of the stockholder.[41] This protection from liability for shareholders is the principle of limited liability.[42] | |||||
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2013-03-06 |
SERENO, J. |
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| This argument does not persuade us, for any piercing of the corporate veil has to be done with caution.[25] Save for its rhetoric, petitioner fails to adduce any evidence that would prove OLFI's status as a dummy corporation. In this regard, we recently explained in Sarona v. NLRC[26] as follows: A court should be mindful of the milieu where it is to be applied. It must be certain that the corporate fiction was misused to such an extent that injustice, fraud, or crime was committed against another, in disregard of rights. The wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established; it cannot be presumed. Otherwise, an injustice that was never unintended may result from an erroneous application. (Citation omitted) | |||||
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2013-02-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| While it is true that the determination of the existence of any of the circumstances that would warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is a question of fact which cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court can take cognizance of factual issues if the findings of the lower court are not supported by the evidence on record or are based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] | |||||
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2012-09-10 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The awards of moral and exemplary damages[45] in favor of respondents are also in order. Moral damages may be recovered where the dismissal of the employee was tainted by bad faith or fraud, or where it constituted an act oppressive to labor, and done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, while exemplary damages are recoverable only if the dismissal was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner.[46] The grant of attorney's fees is likewise proper. Attorney's fees may likewise be awarded to respondents who were illegally dismissed in bad faith and were compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect their rights by reason of the oppressive acts[47] of petitioners. The unjustified act of petitioners had obviously compelled respondents to institute an action primarily to protect their rights and interests which warrants the granting of the award. | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
SERENO, J. |
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| At the fore, the question of whether one corporation is merely an alter ego of another is purely one of fact generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.[35] In any case, given only these bare reiterations, this Court sustains the ruling of the LA as affirmed by the NLRC that Miramar and Mar Fishing are separate and distinct entities, based on the marked differences in their stock ownership.[36] Also, the fact that Mar Fishing's officers remained as such in Miramar does not by itself warrant a conclusion that the two companies are one and the same. As this Court held in Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, the mere showing that the corporations had a common director sitting in all the boards without more does not authorize disregarding their separate juridical personalities.[37] | |||||