This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2005-10-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, we find that TRACKWORKS sufficiently established a right to be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction. The contract with the MRTC vested it the exclusive right to undertake advertising and promotional activities at the MRT 3 structure. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly ruled that what is involved here is not an indiscriminate posting and installation of commercial advertisements but one sanctioned by a contract. If not restrained, the dismantling of, and prohibition from, installing advertisements at the MRT 3 will cause irreparable injury to TRACKWORKS. This is especially so because TRACKWORKS is generally not entitled to recover damages resulting from acts of public officers done in their official capacity and in the honest belief that they have such power.[15] Unless bad faith is clearly proven, TRACKWORKS will be left without recourse even if petitioner is later declared without authority to prohibit the posting of billboards and streamers at the MRT 3 structure. Indeed, prudence dictates that the status quo be preserved until the merits of the case can be heard fully. | |||||
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2000-04-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent..[22] And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable..[23] However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.[24] In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent. | |||||