This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2007-07-10 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits wherein the parties have validly entered into stipulations and the evidence was duly considered by the trial court that approved the agreement.[41] It is immediately executory and not appealable unless set aside on grounds of nullity under Article 2038[42] of the Civil Code,[43] and has the effect of a judgment of the court.[44] Further, well-entrenched is the rule that a party may attack the validity of a final and executory judgment through three ways:The first is by petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, when judgment has been taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, in which case the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, but not more than six (6) months after such judgment was entered. The second is by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment. This remedy presupposes that the challenged judgment is not void upon its face, but is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment. x x x "under accepted principles of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, the proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action enjoining the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of, he may institute suit to recover it." The third is either a direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against the challenged judgment (which is) void upon its face, or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. As aptly explained by Justice Malcolm in his dissent in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, supra, "A judgment which is void upon its face, and which requires only an inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate its want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree, which should be lopped off, if the power so to do exists." In the case at bar, the want of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC in Civil Case No. 1102-P due to the alleged non-service of summons has not been established by petitioner. The judgment based on compromise agreement made therein was likewise not established as being void upon its face. Except for the self-serving allegation that she was in Hong Kong when the collection suit was filed, petitioner did not present competent proof to prove that she was not properly served with summons. Even if it were true that she was abroad when the collection suit was filed against her, summons could still be served through extraterritorial service under Section 16[45] in relation to Section 15,[46] of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Undeniably, the Pasay City RTC in Civil Case No. 1102-P enjoys the presumption of regularity in the conduct of its official duties which was not fully rebutted by petitioner. | |||||