This case has been cited 1 times or more.
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2001-10-10 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an accused to instead be a witness for the state[8] is not a home grown innovation but is one with a long and interesting history. It has its origins in the common law of ancient England where faithful performance of such an agreement with the Crown could entitle a criminal offender to an equitable right to a recommendation for executive clemency. The practice, soon recognized through widespread statutory enactments in other jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own criminal procedure in a short and compact military General Order No. 58 issued in 1900. Its adoption highlights the emphasis placed by the new system on the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, on the requirement that the State must first establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt before an accused can be called upon to defend himself, and on the proscription against compelling an accused to be a witness against himself as well as against drawing inferences of guilt from his silence.[9] Underlying the rule is the deep-lying intent of the State not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished by allowing an accused who appears not to be the most guilty to testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more guilty co-accused. It is aimed at achieving the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number among the accused for an offense committed.[10] | |||||