This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-10-19 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Thus, a distance of one and a half (1 1/2) to two (2) kilometers[36] was held not too far to traverse by walking.[37] Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers,[38] three (3) kilometers,[39] or even five (5) kilometers[40] were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused was present at the locus criminis.[41] Surely then, a distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is not the "physical impossibility" contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi. | |||||
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2013-07-24 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In the case at bench, Marissa failed to satisfy these requisites. During trial, it was shown that the distance between Kagawad Tavora's house and the house of the appellants was only 400 meters. Surely, a distance of 400 meters is not what jurisprudence contemplates when it refers to physical impossibility of the accused to be present at the scene of the crime. We have previously held that two kilometers,[24] three kilometers,[25] and even five kilometers[26] were not too far as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the crime scene. The mere fact, therefore, that Marissa went to the house of Kagawad Tavora did not preclude her presence at their house at the time the crime happened. | |||||
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2002-05-28 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| A I was facing the door. xxx[69] Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. Accused-appellants must not only prove their presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense, but they must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.[70] Where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers,[71] three (3) kilometers,[72] or even five (5) kilometers,[73] the same are not considered to be too far as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis,[74] even if the sole means of travelling between the two places at that time was by walking. In this case, accused-appellants' respective houses were found to be more or less only one-half kilometer away from the scene of the crime. They were, in fact, within earshot of the place because they all testified that they heard the gunshots from their respective houses. Hence, it was not physically impossible for accused-appellants to have been within the vicinity of the house of Jose Japitana at the time the victim was shot. | |||||
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2001-10-10 |
PARDO, J. |
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| In a case, the Court ruled that if a witness is not impeached during cross-examination, his testimony "must be taken as any other testimony, with the presumption of truthfulness as it was given under oath."[40] | |||||
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2001-06-19 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| It is jurisprudentially-embedded that where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers,[29] three (3) kilometers,[30] or even five (5) kilometers,[31] the same are not considered to be too far as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis, even if the sole means of traveling between the two places at that time was only by walking.[32] In this case, appellant's house was found to be only a half (1/2) kilometer away from the scene of the crime.[33] | |||||