This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2012-03-20 |
ABAD, J. |
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| It is clear that the Constitution explicitly clothes "any citizen" with the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. The Constitution does not make any distinction as to who can bring such an action. As discussed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the "citizen" who can challenge the declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ need not even be a taxpayer.[17] This was deliberately designed to arrest, without further delay, the grave effects of an illegal declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ, and to provide immediate relief to those aggrieved by the same. Accordingly, petitioners, being Filipino citizens, possess legal standing to file the present petitions assailing the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 1959. | |||||
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2012-03-20 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Thirty-seven years after President Marcos' Proclamation No. 1081, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Maguindanao, except in MILF identified areas. President Marcos' martial law, justified to counteract the Communist insurgency in the country,[67] turned out to be a vehicle to establish a one-man authoritarian rule in the country. Expectedly, President Arroyo's Proclamation No. 1959 refreshed the nation's bitter memories of the tyranny during the Martial Law regime of President Marcos, and sparked the public's vigilance to prevent a possible recurrence of that horrible past. | |||||
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2009-03-13 |
TINGA, J. |
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| A final note. The preventive suspension order insofar as Mayor Evagelista is concerned has been rendered moot and academic. The Mayor was re-elected and proclaimed during the May 2007 elections as evidenced by the certificate of canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for the Municipality of Aguilar, Pangasinan.[34] This Court has consistently ruled that elective officials may not be held administratively liable for misconduct committed during a previous term of office.[35] The rationale for this rule is that it is assumed that the electorate returned the official to power with full knowledge of past misconduct and in fact condoned it. It should be stressed that this forgiveness only applies to the administrative liability; the State may still pursue the official in a criminal case. | |||||