This case has been cited 1 times or more.
|
2000-11-22 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
||||
| In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of "one and one-fourth (1¼) months of salary for every year of service" cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public offices.[4] However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith.[5] The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected. | |||||