This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2013-07-24 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| In the case at bench, Marissa failed to satisfy these requisites. During trial, it was shown that the distance between Kagawad Tavora's house and the house of the appellants was only 400 meters. Surely, a distance of 400 meters is not what jurisprudence contemplates when it refers to physical impossibility of the accused to be present at the scene of the crime. We have previously held that two kilometers,[24] three kilometers,[25] and even five kilometers[26] were not too far as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the crime scene. The mere fact, therefore, that Marissa went to the house of Kagawad Tavora did not preclude her presence at their house at the time the crime happened. | |||||
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2006-02-22 |
PANGANIBAN, CJ |
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| As stated earlier, the power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an executive function. Essentially, it is not a judicial prerogative.[62] The fact that an individual had not been previously charged or included in an information does not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person as a witness.[63] | |||||
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2001-06-19 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| It is jurisprudentially-embedded that where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers,[29] three (3) kilometers,[30] or even five (5) kilometers,[31] the same are not considered to be too far as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis, even if the sole means of traveling between the two places at that time was only by walking.[32] In this case, appellant's house was found to be only a half (1/2) kilometer away from the scene of the crime.[33] | |||||