This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-12-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,[23] a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of homicide with a prescribed penalty of reclusión temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this case, the imposable penalty is reclusión temporal in its maximum period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. The court then had the discretion to impose any prison term provided it is within said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal,[24] which is a single fixed penalty, with no minimum or maximum term. | |||||
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2001-03-20 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the Ombudsman. This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x." Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou[24] that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:"The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein).[25] The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts." IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE. | |||||
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2001-01-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Petitioners insist that Section 4 of R.A. No. 1597 refers to voluntary conveyances, while Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 refers to involuntary conveyances. This distinction is of no moment. Concerning encumbrances and alienations therein mentioned, Section 4 makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary conveyances. There should also be no distinction in the application of the law where none is indicated.[22] Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.[23] | |||||