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ANG TIBAY v. CIR

This case has been cited 13 times or more.

2016-01-25
BRION, J.
Substantial evidence is "evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[85] The Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the Affidavit[86] dated May 7, 2008 of Compliance Investigator Paner. This piece of evidence related how petitioner consented to the sharing of the P200,000.00 extorted from Luciana M. Jaen: 13. That pretending nothing had happened and yet projecting to the group that I am a bit apprehensive as to the evident inequality in the sharing of the extorted money from subject Jaen, I was able to talk with Agent Erwin Magcamit, one of the members of the arresting team, and asked the latter as to how the group came up with the Php21,500.00 sharing for each member out of the Php200,000.00; from which Agent Magcamit simply said to me that such was the sharing and everybody except me seemed to have consented; in addition thereto, Agent Magcamit vividly mentioned all other members who got their share of the Php21,500.00, namely, [1] Carlos S. Aldeon, [2] PO3 Emerson Adaviles, [3] PO2 Reywin Bariuad, [4] 102 Renato Infante, [5] IO2 Apolinario Mationg, [6] 102 Ryan C. Alfaro, and [7] PO3 Peter Sistemio.[87] (Emphasis supplied)
2015-02-03
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Meanwhile, on October 31, 2012, a Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) was issued in connection with RP Energy's application for the 2x300-MW coal-fired power plant.[51]
2015-01-13
LEONEN, J.
This court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[77] ruled that administrative due process requires only the following: (a) The party should be allowed to present his or her own case and submit supporting evidence; (b) The deciding tribunal must consider the party's evidence; (c) There is evidence to support the tribunal's decision; (d) The evidence supporting the tribunal's decision must be substantial or such "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion";[78] (e) The tribunal's decision was based on the evidence presented or the records of the case disclosed to the parties; (f) The tribunal's decision must be based on the judges' independent consideration of the facts and law governing the case; and (g) The tribunal's decision must be rendered such that the issues of the case and the reasons for the decisions are known to the parties.[79] In sum, due process in administrative proceedings does not necessarily require a trial type of hearing. Neither does it require an exchange of pleadings between or among the parties. Due process is satisfied if the party who is properly notified of allegations against him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent conclusions. This court explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:[80]
2013-09-18
DEL CASTILLO, J.
For the FIRST YEAR: P18   For the SECOND YEAR: 15   For the THIRD YEAR: 12     P45 for three (3) years[30]   As can be seen, the Secretary of Labor failed to indicate the actual data upon which the wage award was based. It even appears that she utilized the "middle ground" approach which we precisely warned against in Meralco. Factors such as the actual and projected net operating income, impact of the wage increase on net operating income, the company's previous CBAs, and industry trends were not discussed in detail so that the precise bases of the wage award are not discernible on the face of the Decision. The contending parties are effectively precluded from seeking a review of the wage award, even if proper under our ruling in Meralco, because of the general but unsubstantiated statement in the Decision that the wage award was based on factors like the bargaining history, trends of arbitrated and agreed awards, and industry trends. In fine, there is no way of determining if the Secretary of Labor utilized the proper evidence, figures or data in arriving at the subject wage award as well as the reasonableness thereof. This falls short of the requirement of administrative due process obligating the decision-maker to adjudicate the rights of the parties in such a manner that they can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.[31]
2012-04-25
SERENO, J.
However, the DAR's issuance of an Emancipation Patent and the corresponding OCT covering the contested lot carries with it a presumption of regularity.[30]  The Petition to correct/cancel Pablo's Emancipation Patent can prosper only if petitioners are able to present substantial evidence that a portion of their lot was erroneously covered by the patent. Substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[31]
2011-12-05
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Indeed, labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. [27]  However, in every proceeding before it, the fundamental and essential requirements of due process should not to be ignored but must at all times be respected. [28]  Besides, petitioners' case concerns their job, considered as a property right, of which they could not be deprived of without due process. [29]
2010-12-08
MENDOZA, J.
Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the taxpayer must first be informed that he is liable for deficiency taxes through the sending of a PAN. He must be informed of the facts and the law upon which the assessment is made. The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal, requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without first establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal principle in administrative investigations - that taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce supporting evidence.[14]
2006-07-25
PER CURIAM
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]
2006-01-27
PANGANIBAN, CJ.
The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal, requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without first establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal principle in administrative investigations: that taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce supporting evidence.[19] In the instant case, respondent has not been informed of the basis of the estate tax liability. Without complying with the unequivocal mandate of first informing the taxpayer of the government's claim, there can be no deprivation of property, because no effective protest can be made.[20] The haphazard shot at slapping an assessment, supposedly based on estate taxation's general provisions that are expected to be known by the taxpayer, is utter chicanery.
2005-11-15
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations,[47] we held that the provision for flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative value.  In the present case, since petitioner claims that respondents are confidential employees and can be dismissed on loss of trust and confidence, the attachments to respondents' appeal memorandum, namely: (a) the letter dated February 6, 1997 from the petitioner's Board of Directors confirming respondent La Victoria's regular appointment as SMRTA, effective January 8, 1997, after six months probationary period, with a salary of P3,000 a month;[48] (b) the letter dated July 11, 1996 from the petitioner's Board of Directors confirming respondent Angara's regular appointment as SMRTA, effective June 4, 1996 with a salary of P3,000 a month;[49] (c) the letter dated July 28, 1997 from Richard S. Syhongpan (Syhongpan), Branch Manager, Casino Filipino, Davao, addressed to respondent Angara informing her of preventive suspension effective same date, pending investigation;[50] (d) two letters, both dated July 1, 1997, from Syhongpan, separately addressed to respondents, requiring them to appear before the Branch Management Panel;[51] (e) the letter dated July 2, 1998 of respondent La Victoria addressed to the Branch Manager, explaining her side on the incident she was investigated on;[52] (f) the Memorandum dated July 5, 1997 from Syhongpan directing respondent Angara to report to the Corporate Office on July 7, 1997 for further investigation;[53] (g) the two letters, both of July 23, 1997, separately addressed to respondents, from Teresita S. Ela, Managing Head of the Personnel Administration Department of PAGCOR, informing them that the Board of Directors in the meeting on July 22,  1997 resolved to dismiss them from service for loss of trust and confidence effective June 28, 1997;[54] (h) respondents' appeal for reconsideration dated August 12, 1997 filed with Alicia Ll. Reyes, Chairman and Chief Executor Officer of PAGCOR;[55] (i) respondents' tracer letter dated September 12, 1997 addressed to Reyes, requesting speedy disposition of their appeal for reconsideration;[56] (j) the Reply to Endorsement of Appeal for Reconsideration, dated September 12, 1997 from Reyes addressed to then Senate President Ernesto Maceda, on the denial of respondent La Victoria's appeal for reconsideration of their dismissal;[57]  and (k) the letter dated September 17, 1997 from Romeo T. Trio, PAGCOR's Corporate Secretary, informing respondents of the denial of their appeal for reconsideration by the PAGCOR's Board of Directors;[58] and settled jurisprudence enunciated in  Civil Service Commission vs. Salas and Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Rilloraza, are sufficient bases for the CSC's decision in favor of respondents.
2003-11-28
AZCUNA, J.
The rules providing for the abovementioned summary hearing were mandated to accord due process of law to candidates during elections. The right to due process is a cardinal and primary right which must be respected in all proceedings.[8] It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play,[9] the cornerstone of every democratic society. In any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[10] Respondent Comelec's argument that petitioners have already been constructively notified of the inquiry against them cannot be given merit. Petitioners herein were not even informed of the administrative inquiry against them, nor were they called upon to adduce their own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence against them. Petitioners certainly cannot read the minds of those tasked to look into their certificates of candidacy, nor did they have any way of knowing that a proceeding had already been instituted against them and that they were entitled to present evidence on their behalf.