This case has been cited 2 times or more.
|
2009-01-20 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.[42] Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.[43] Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,[44] movie theaters,[45] gas stations[46] and cockpits.[47] The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has rarely been denied. | |||||
|
2006-03-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus, an ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would result in the diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and safety of the customers.[21] In U.S. v. Toribio,[22] the court upheld the provisions of Act No. 1147, a statute regulating the slaughter of carabao for the purpose of conserving an adequate supply of draft animals, as a valid exercise of police power, notwithstanding the property rights impairment that the ordinance imposed on cattle owners. A zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a lumber yard within certain areas was assailed as unconstitutional in that it was an invasion of the property rights of the lumber yard owners in People v. de Guzman.[23] The Court nonetheless ruled that the regulation was a valid exercise of police power. A similar ruling was arrived at in Seng Kee S Co. v. Earnshaw and Piatt[24] where an ordinance divided the City of Manila into industrial and residential areas. A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be | |||||