This case has been cited 3 times or more.
2016-01-26 |
BRION, J. |
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There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;[6] where power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice; or where action is impelled by personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[7] | |||||
2016-01-12 |
BRION, J. |
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There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,[46] where power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[47] | |||||
2007-08-07 |
GARCIA, J. |
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There is grave abuse of discretion only when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[9] Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is grave abuse of discretion.[10] Hence, in his dissent, Justice Brawner noted with dismay:x x x Sadly, the majority, in resolving the issue, may have trodden on territory forbidden to the Judicature when they completely foreclosed the right of [petitioner] to a trial of her accusations on the merits, by substituting the judgment of this Court to that of the agency of the Executive Branch specifically tasked with the prosecution of criminal offenses. Differently stated, We may have acted like prosecutors when We should have acted more magisterially.[11] |