This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2001-09-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Article 1592 requires the rescinding party to serve judicial or notarial notice of his intent to resolve the contract.[16] | |||||
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2000-08-01 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| in the first place. As we earlier pointed out, in a contract to sell, title remains with the vendor and does not pass on to the vendee until the purchase price is paid in full. Thus, in a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure to pay the price agreed upon is not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.[20] This is entirely different from the situation in a contract of sale, where non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition. The effects in law are not identical. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost ownership of the thing sold and cannot recover it, unless the contract of sale is rescinded and set aside.[21] In a contract to sell, however, the vendor remains the owner for as long as the vendee has not complied fully with the condition of paying the purchase price. If the vendor should eject the vendee for failure to meet the condition precedent, he is enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. When the petitioners in the instant case repossessed the disputed house and lot for failure of private respondents to pay the purchase price in full, they were merely enforcing the contract and not rescinding it. As petitioners correctly point out, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners should have judicially rescinded the contract pursuant to Articles 1592 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Article 1592 speaks of non-payment of the purchase price as a resolutory condition. It does not apply to a contract to sell.[22] As to Article 1191, it is subordinated to the provisions of Article 1592 when applied to sales of immovable property.[23] Neither provision is applicable in the present case. As to the last issue, we need not tarry to make a determination of whether the breach of contract by private respondents is so substantial as to defeat the purpose of the parties in entering into the agreement and thus entitle petitioners to rescission. Having ruled | |||||