This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2008-04-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.[28] Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[29] Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.[30] | |||||
|
2007-06-07 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| The listing of sections in Section 262 is introduced by the clause: "Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the following sections shall constitute election offenses: x x x." The phraseology of this introductory clause alerts us that Section 262 itself possibly limits its coverage to only pertinent portions of Section 74. That such a possibility exists must not be taken lightly for two reasons. First, were the phrase not necessary, the law's framers would have instead directly declared that violation of "the provisions" or "any provision" of the enumerated sections without any qualification would constitute an election offense. It is a settled principle in statutory construction that whenever possible, a legal provision, phrase, or word must not be so construed as to be meaningless and a useless surplusage in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect on it.[5] Second, equally well-settled is the rule that a statute imposing criminal liability should be construed narrowly in its coverage such that only those offenses clearly included, beyond reasonable doubt, will be considered within the operation of the statute.[6] A return to Section 74 is thus imperative. | |||||
|
2003-10-07 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.[26] Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110[27] of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with finality. | |||||
|
2002-02-27 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
||||
| Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court does not agree. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating circumstances, which work to reduce the accused's penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to consider "any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those" mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances[24] nor Article 15 on alternative circumstances,[25] however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider appellant's drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them.[26] | |||||