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[ GR No. 4735, Aug 07, 1911 ]



19 Phil. 444

[ G. R. No. 4735, August 07, 1911 ]




The complaint in the  present case alleges the following facts:
"1.  That the  deceased  husband of the complainant, Gregorio  Garcia, possessed  four parcels of  land situated  in the sitio of Cataratara-an,  municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, which are described in the complaint itself.

"2.  That upon  the death of Gregorio Garcia, the complainant and her minor sons Paciano, Lorenzo and  Clodoaldo, had by  the deceased during their married  life, succeeded him in possession of the estates described, which have  remained up to the  present time undivided and under the administration of  the  said complainant.

"3.  That notwithstanding the lawful possession in which the successors to Gregorio Garcia, held the  said property, a lady named Remigia Madamba ordered, in the harvest just passed, that of the year 1906, that the paddy cut on these lands by the tenant of said complainant,  amounting to 4 uyones and 8 boars, be taken from the storehouse on the said lands, in which it was being stored; and further ordered cut the paddy that had not  yet been harvested.

"4.  That on account of such conduct  of Remigia Madamba and because her actions tend to disturb the legal and peaceful possession  of the  owners, the complainant who  now appeals to your honorable court begs, on behalf of herself and  her said minor sons,  a  final injunction  against  the aforesaid Remigia Madamba."
And closes with the following petition:
"It is therefore prayed that the court, after admission of this  complaint  with its  attached  informal  copy,  subject the same to the proper procedure and,  after the legal action required in the  case, pronounce judgment by ordering the issuance of a final injunction perpetually restraining  the commission or continuation of the act that  gave rise to the complaint,  with the damages provided in section  170 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
After due  trial of the  case, judgment was  rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the issuance of the injunction requested in  the complaint; from which judgment the defendant appealed to this  court.

The complaint has for  its only and exclusive object, as has just been seen, to secure the issuance of a final injunction  against the defendant.  Absolutely nothing more than that  was asked therein, and in fact nothing else was granted or allowed in the judgment appealed  from.   The question is therefore  reduced to determining the  propriety of  said injunction in this case.

The permanent or final injunction is one  of the special remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure now in force.  Necessarily it does not issue except upon the condition, common to all special remedies, that no other ordinary, speedy and adequate remedy exists for avoiding or repairing the damage done, or which may be done, by an act in violation  of the plaintiff's rights.   (Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. Rep., 273.)

The facts  alleged in  the  complaint  involve questions of property or  of  possession that should be formulated and decided by prosecution of the actions that arise from one or the other right.   Under the  first  point  of view recovery would be  proper, and  under the second restitution  of  the possession Of which the plaintiff is alleged to be unjustly deprived or despoiled.  In either case, there exists the ordinary remedy of action for property of  possession, which may be either plenary or summary, according to the method by  which she may have been deprived of her alleged possession.  As such ordinary remedy exists, entirely adequate to  correct the violations committed against  the right  of property of possession, such as those set  forth in the complaint, it appears that the facts alleged therein, which were the basis of the action, do not constitute proper material for the final  injunction asked therein, because, as has been said before, this remedy is applied only in so  far as there does not exist any ordinary and efficacious remedy for protecting the plaintiff or restoring to her the possession and exercise of her right.

The reason for this principle has been clearly stated in the decision in the case of Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., 273, 279), above cited :
"To hold otherwise - was there stated - would be to render practically of no effect the various provisions of the code touching many if not most of the ordinary actions, and the enforcement  of judgment in such  actions; for it may well be supposed that if a  complainant could secure relief by injunction  in every case where  'the  defendant is doing  or threatens or  is about to do, or is procuring or is suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights' and could enforce  the  judgment  granting the  injunction  by the  summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights  in such  cases by the; ordinary remedies, involving as they do the difficult and ofttimes  fruitless  labor of enforcing judgments  obtained therein by  execution."
With reversal of the judgment appealed from the present case  is dismissed,  without finding as to costs  in  either instance.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.