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CIR v. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA

This case has been cited 35 times or more.

2015-08-10
SERENO, C.J.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of both parties, the Special First Division rendered an Amended Decision on 1 December 2010. The original Decision was set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration of the CIR, granted.  Citing CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[10] the CTA Special First Division ruled that it had no jurisdiction over TPC’s Petitions, which were thus dismissed.
2015-07-15
SERENO, C.J.
On appeal, following this Court’s disposition in Aichi,[8] the CTA en banc denied the Petition and ruled that the judicial claim had been filed out of time.  It held that, under Section 112(C) of the NIRC, the 120-day period for the BIR to act on the claim should be reckoned from 28 December 2009 or the date of filing of petitioner’s administrative claim with the tax agency. Counting 120 days from 28 December 2009, the BIR had until 27 April 2010 to decide the administrative claim.  Thereafter, petitioner had until 27 May 2010 or 30 days to appeal to the CTA either the decision or the inaction of the BIR. Thus, the filing of the Petition for Review with the CTA Division on 6 July 2010 was clearly beyond the period allowed by law.[9]
2015-03-11
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Separately, however, the CTA Division superseded and consequently reversed its August 24, 2010 Decision. Citing the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[24] it held that the 120-day period provided under Section 112(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) must be observed prior to the filing of a judicial claim for tax refund.[25] As Cargill failed to comply therewith, the CTA Division, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the consolidated cases for being prematurely filed.[26]
2015-01-21
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, as well as for leave of court to present supplemental evidence to bolster its claim for tax refund/credit.[16] The CTA Division granted petitioner's leave of court.[17] After the presentation of the supplemental evidence, the CTA Division, in an Amended Decision[18] dated December 6, 2010, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and dismissed its claim for tax refund/credit outright albeit on a different ground. It found that petitioner filed its judicial claim for tax refund/credit on January 20, 2006, or a mere 22 days after it filed its administrative claim on December 29, 2005.[19] Citing the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[20] the CTA Division held that the observance of the 120-day period provided under Section 112(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of a judicial claim for tax refund/credit, thus concluding that petitioner's judicial claim for tax refund/credit must be dismissed for being prematurely filed.[21]
2015-01-14
SERENO, C.J.
These mistaken notions have already been dispelled by Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi)[22] and San Roque. Aichi clarified that it is only the administrative claim that must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period.[23] San Roque, on the other hand, has ruled that the 30-day period always applies, whether there is a denial or inaction on the part of the CIR.[24]
2014-12-18
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[28] the Court held that the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requisite to the filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently, its non-observance would lead to the dismissal of the judicial claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aichi also clarified that the two (2)-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims.[29] Succinctly put, once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end; thereafter, he is given a 30-day period to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period.[30]
2014-12-08
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
On December 7, 2010, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) filed a Motion to Dismiss,[15] praying for the dismissal of CTA Case No. 8082 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[16] Relying on the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[17] the CIR contended that since the judicial claim for refund/credit in Case No. 8082 was filed only 107 days from the filing of the administrative claim,[18] it should be dismissed for being prematurely filed for petitioner's failure to comply with the 120-day period prescribed under Section 112 (D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).[19]
2014-11-26
MENDOZA, J.
In light of the ruling in CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[7] (Aichi), the CTA En Banc held that in accordance with Section 112(C) of the NIRC, it was incumbent upon the taxpayer to give the CIR a period of 120 days to either partially or fully deny the claim; and it was only upon the denial of the claim or after the expiration of the 120-day period without action, that the taxayer could seek judicial recourse. Considering that Taganito filed its judicial claim before the expiration of the 120-day period, the CTA En Banc ruled that the judicial claim was prematurely filed and, consequently, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
2014-11-19
MENDOZA, J.
Citing the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[5] (Aichi), the CTA En Banc concluded that the premature filing of a petition for review before the CTA in a claim for refund or credit of input VAT warranted a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA. It stated that in claiming a tax refund or tax credit under Section 112 of the NIRC, the taxpayer should apply for refund/credit of unutilized input VAT within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. Thereafter, the CIR has 120 days from the date of the submission of the complete documents within which to grant or deny the claim. If the CIR decided during the 120-day period, or failed to act on the application for tax refund/credit after the 120-day period, the remedy of the tax payer is to appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR to the CTA within 30 days from the decision or inaction.
2014-10-22
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It should be pointed out that on October 6, 2010, the Court held in the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[34] (Aichi) that the phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.[35] The Court gave three (3) compelling reasons for this ruling in San Roque, namely: First, Section 112(A) clearly, plainly, and unequivocally provides that the taxpayer "may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of the creditable input tax due or paid to such sales." In short, the law states that the taxpayer may apply with the Commissioner for a refund or credit "within two (2) years," which means at anytime within two years. Thus, the application for refund or credit may be filed by the taxpayer with the Commissioner on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period and it will still strictly comply with the law. The two-year prescriptive period is a grace period in favor of the taxpayer and he can avail of the full period before his right to apply for a tax refund or credit is barred by prescription.
2014-09-30
LEONEN, J.
Petitioner submits that the recent cases of Silicon Philippines Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[29] and Southern Philippines Power Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[30] should have been considered.  These are inconsistent with the ruling in the earlier case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia;[31] thus, Aichi should not be applied.[32]
2014-09-30
LEONEN, J.
In the fairly recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,[61] this court En Banc affirmed with qualification the decision of its First Division in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[62]  This court held that compliance with the 120-day and the 30-day periods under Section 112 of the Tax Code, save for those Value-added Tax refund cases that were prematurely (i.e., before the lapse of the 120-day period) filed with the Court of Tax Appeals between December 10, 2003 (when the Bureau of Internal Revenue Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) and October 6, 2010, is mandatory and jurisdictional.[63]
2014-09-17
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[28] (Aichi), the Court held that the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requisite to the filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently, its non-observance would lead to the dismissal of the judicial claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aichi also clarified that the two (2)-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims.[29] Succinctly put, once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a 30-day period to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period.[30]
2014-06-30
PERALTA, J.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.[39] Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,[40] which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,[41] thus: x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
2014-06-30
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
San Roque filed a Petition for Review before the CTA en banc, protesting against the retroactive application of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[8]  In Aichi, promulgated on October 6, 2010, the Supreme Court strictly required compliance with the 120+30 day periods under Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended.
2014-06-18
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In a Decision[15] dated January 11, 2011, the CTA En Banc reversed and set aside the Decision of the CTA Division, and ordered that Taganito's claim of refund be denied in its entire amount. It found that Taganito filed its judicial claim for refund on March 31, 2006, or a mere 93 days after it filed its administrative claim on December 28, 2005. Explaining that the observance of the 120-day period provided under Section 112(D) of the NIRC is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of a judicial claim for refund pursuant to the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[16] it held that Taganito's filing of a judicial claim was premature, and, thus, the CTA Division had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the same.[17]
2014-06-18
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,[18] this Court clarified the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day period provided under Section 112(C) of the NIRC.  We clarified that the two-year prescriptive period under Section 112(A)[19] of the NIRC refers only to the filing of an administrative claim with the BIR. Meanwhile, the judicial claim under Section 112(C) of the NIRC must be filed within a mandatory and jurisdictional period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the decision denying the claim, or within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period for deciding the claim.  Thus, we mandated strict compliance with this "120+30" day period: Section 112(D) [now Section 112(C)] of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer's recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
2014-06-09
PERALTA, J.
Tax refunds are based on the general premise that taxes have either been erroneously or excessively paid. Though the Tax Code recognizes the right of taxpayers to request the return of such excess/erroneous payments from the government, they must do so within a prescribed period. Further, "a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund, but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would result in the denial of his claim."[36]
2014-06-04
MENDOZA, J.
The CTA En Banc explained that although VGPC seasonably filed its administrative claim within the two-year prescriptive period, its judicial claim filed with the CTA Second Division was prematurely filed under Section 112(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Citing the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[9] the CTA En Banc held that the judicial claim filed 28 days after the petitioner filed its administrative claim, without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day period, was premature and, thus, the CTA acquired no jurisdiction over the case.
2014-06-04
MENDOZA, J.
Upholding the ruling in Aichi,[16] San Roque held that the 120+30 day period prescribed under Section 112(D) mandatory and jurisdictional.[17] The jurisdiction of the CTA over decisions or inaction of the CIR is only appellate in nature and, thus, necessarily requires the prior filing of an administrative case before the CIR under Section 112.[18] The CTA can only acquire jurisdiction over a case after the CIR has rendered its decision, or after the lapse of the period for the CIR to act, in which case such inaction is considered a denial.[19] A petition filed prior to the lapse of the 120-day period prescribed under said Section would be premature for violating the doctrine on the exhaustion of administrative remedies.[20]
2014-02-19
SERENO, C.J.
The Court, in San Roque, ruled that equitable estoppel had set in when respondent issued BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. This was a general interpretative rule, which effectively misled all taxpayers into filing premature judicial claims with the CTA. Thus, taxpayers could rely on the ruling from its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal on 6 October 2010, when CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[16] was promulgated.
2014-02-05
REYES, J.
The pivotal question of whether the imminent lapse of the two-year period under Section 112(A) of the NIRC justifies the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA without awaiting the lapse of the 120-day period given to the CIR to decide the administrative claim for refund/tax credit had already been settled by the Court. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,[16] the Court held that:However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we are constrained to deny respondent's claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section 112([C]) of the NIRC, x x x:
2014-01-15
SERENO, C.J.
On appeal, relying on Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[10] the CTA En Banc ruled that petitioner's judicial claim for the first, second, and third quarters of 2005 were belatedly filed.
2014-01-15
SERENO, C.J.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi), we dispelled the misconception that both the administrative and judicial claims must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period:[37]
2014-01-13
PERALTA, J.
On November 26, 2010, the CTA Special First Division rendered an Amended Decision granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. In light of this Court's ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company, Inc.[6]
2013-12-11
MENDOZA, J.
As to the first issue, petitioner argues that the judicial claim was filed out of time because respondent failed to comply with the 30-day period referred to in Section 112(D) (now subparagraph C) of the NIRC, citing the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi[16] where the Court categorically held that compliance with the prescribed periods in Section 112 is mandatory and jurisdictional. Respondent filed its administrative claim for refund on August 9, 2004. The 120-day period within which the CIR should act on the claim expired on December 7, 2004 without any action on the part of petitioner. Thus, respondent only had 30 days from the lapse of the said period, or until January 6, 2005, to file a petition for review with the CTA. The petition, however, was filed only on May 5, 2005.[17] Petitioner further posits that the 30-day period within which to file an appeal with the CTA is jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith would bar the appeal and deprive the CTA of its jurisdiction to entertain the same.[18]
2013-11-11
SERENO, C.J.
Records, however, show that the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July 2002.[15] Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory 120-day waiting period.  Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warranted a dismissal, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.[16]
2013-11-11
MENDOZA, J.
This ruling was later reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,[23] where this Court upheld the ruling in Mirant that the appropriate provision for determining the prescriptive period for claiming a refund or a tax credit for unutilized input VAT is Section 112(A), and not Section 229, of the NIRC.[24]
2013-10-17
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The Court had already clarified in the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),[34] promulgated on October 6, 2010, that the two-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims.  Morever, it was ruled that the 120-day and 30-day periods are not merely directory but mandatory.  Accordingly, the judicial claim of Aichi, which was simultaneously filed with its administrative claim, was found to be premature.  The Court held: In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) [now Section 112 (C)] of the NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) [now Section 112 (C)] of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2) when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
2013-03-13
MENDOZA, J.
In another reversal of opinion, the CTA En Banc set aside the March 24, 2009 Amended Decision and the June 16, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division and dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.  In its May 13, 2011 Resolution,[14] the CTA En Banc held that the 120-day period under Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which granted the CIR the opportunity to act on the claim for refund, was jurisdictional in nature such that petitioner's failure to observe the said period before resorting to judicial action warranted the dismissal of its petition for review for having been prematurely filed, in accordance with the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.[15]  With respect to the use of official receipts interchangeably with sales invoices, the tax court cited the ruling of the Court in Kepco Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[16] which concluded that a VAT invoice and a VAT receipt should not be confused as referring to the same thing.  A VAT invoice was the seller's best proof of the sale of the goods or services to the buyer while the VAT receipt was the buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods and services received from the seller.
2013-03-11
CARPIO, J.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 24 November 2010, the CTA En Banc agreed with the CIR's claim that Section 229 of the NIRC of 1997 is inapplicable in light of this Court's ruling in Mirant. The CTA En Banc also ruled that the procedure prescribed under Section 112(D) [now 112(C)][37] of the 1997 Tax Code should be followed first before the CTA En Banc can act on Mindanao I's claim. The CTA En Banc reconsidered its 31 May 2010 Decision in light of this Court's ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi).[38]
2013-02-12
CARPIO, J.
The CTA EB declared that Section 112(A) and (B) of the 1997 Tax Code both set forth the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim for tax refund or credit over input VAT to be the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. The CTA EB also relied on this Court's rulings in the cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi)[30] and Commisioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant).[31] Both Aichi and Mirant ruled that the two-year prescriptive period to file a refund for input VAT arising from zero-rated sales should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. Aichi further emphasized that the failure to await the decision of the Commissioner or the lapse of 120-day period prescribed in Section 112(D) amounts to a premature filing.