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REPUBLIC v. COCOFED ET AL.

This case has been cited 31 times or more.

2012-11-27
VELASCO JR., J.
In this case, the coconut levy funds were being exacted from copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products.[57] Likewise so, the funds here were channeled to the purchase of the shares of stock in UCPB. Drawing a clear parallelism between Gaston and this case, the fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from the persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. Parenthetically, the said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the government.[58]  (Emphasis Ours.)
2012-11-27
VELASCO JR., J.
In this case, out of the 72.2% FUB (now UCPB) shares of stocks PCA purchased using the coconut levy funds, the May 25, 1975 Agreement between the PCA and Cojuangco provided for the transfer to the latter, by way of compensation, of 10% of the shares subject of the agreement, or a total of 7.22% fully paid shares. In sum, Cojuangco received public assets in the form of FUB (UCPB) shares with a value then of ten million eight hundred eighty-six thousand pesos (PhP 10,886,000) in 1975, paid by coconut levy funds. In effect, Cojuangco received the aforementioned asset as a result of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement, and exclusively benefited himself by owning property acquired using solely public funds. Cojuangco, no less, admitted that the PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares.[63] This is in clear violation of the prohibition, which the Court seeks to uphold.
2012-04-18
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
On March 12, 2008, the CA rendered a decision[16] dismissing UP's petition for certiorari.  Citing Republic v. COCOFED,[17] which defines public funds as moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivisions of the State, more specifically taxes, customs, duties and moneys raised by operation of law for the support of the government or the discharge of its obligations, the appellate court ruled that the funds sought to be garnished do not seem to fall within the stated definition.
2012-04-10
ABAD, J.
Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the government's general funds but to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State.[51]  The funds sought to support the coconut industry, one of the main economic backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and farm workers.  The subject laws are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec. 7(b) of P.D. 388,[52] and the oil price stabilization funds under P.D. 1956,[53] as amended by E.O. 137.[54]
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it would later reimburse itself from the coconut levy fund.[34]
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the State's inherent power of taxation.  As We wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:[109]
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character....  In Cocofed v. PCGG, the Court observed that certain agencies or enterprises "were organized and financed with revenues derived from coconut levies imposed under a succession of law of the late dictatorship ... with deposed Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies as the suspected authors and chief beneficiaries of the resulting coconut industry monopoly."  The Court continued: "....  It cannot be denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy.  It is, therefore, the State's concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability.[110]  (Emphasis Ours)
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
Similarly in this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others,[118] with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.[119]  Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind  the imposition of  taxes or levies.
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
In this case, the coconut levy funds were being exacted from copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products.[122]  Likewise so, the funds here were channeled to the purchase of the shares of stock in UCPB. Drawing a clear parallelism between Gaston and this case, the fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from the persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds - or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. Parenthetically, the said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the government.[123]
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
[124] Republic v. COCOFED, G.R. No. 147062-64, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 462, 491.
2012-01-24
VELASCO JR., J.
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF "to advance the government's avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry."[132]  Evidently, the CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer purchases of coconut products. To put it a bit differently, the protection of the entire coconut industry, and even more importantly, for the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund.  There can be no quibbling then that the  foregoing provisions of P.D. No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein  not especially for the coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless  redound to the benefit of the farmers.  Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: "[the coconut levy] fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them in their private capacities;"[133] or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the general fund of the national government later on;[134] or the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free,[135] violated the special public  purpose for which the CCSF was established.
2011-04-12
BERSAMIN, J.
In the meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan, in order to conform with the ruling in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Cojuangco, et al.,[26] resolved COCOFED's Omnibus Motion (with prayer for preliminary injunction) relative to who should vote the UCPB shares under sequestration, holding as follows: [27]
2011-04-12
BERSAMIN, J.
The trial hereon shall proceed on November 21, 2006, at 8:30 in the morning as previously scheduled.[73]
2011-04-12
BERSAMIN, J.
In Republic v. Migriño,[93] the Court held that respondents Migriño, et al. were not necessarily among the persons covered by the term close subordinate or close associate of former President Marcos by reason alone of their having served as government officials or employees during the Marcos administration, viz: It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondent's case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter. xxx
2010-02-02
CORONA, J.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.[29] Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.[30]
2009-09-17
VELASCO JR., J.
Eventually, the coconut levy funds that were used to acquire the sequestered CIIF SMC common shares in question were peremptorily determined to be prima facie public funds. The Court, in Republic v. COCOFED,[7] elucidated on the nature of the coconut levy funds: Coconut Levy Funds Are Prima Facie Public Funds
2009-09-17
VELASCO JR., J.
Ownership includes the right to enjoy, dispose of, exclude and recover a thing without limitations other than those established by law or by the owner. x x x And the right to vote shares is a mere incident of ownership. In the present case, the government has been shown to be the prima facie owner of the funds used to purchase the shares. Hence, it should be allowed the rights and privileges flowing from such fact.[9]
2008-10-14
CARPIO MORALES, J.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.[54] Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.[55] The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.[56]
2008-02-15
PUNO, C.J.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid,[58] and "any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,"[59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
2007-09-11
TINGA, J.
Anyhow, the issue of negligence is related to the issue of Rescue Security's liability for the loss of the medicines because the absence thereof is one of the exculpating circumstances expressly recognized in Paragraph 6[27] of the Contract of Security Services. Indeed, this Court has the authority to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if the unassigned errors refer to matters upon which depends the determination of the questions raised by the errors properly assigned.[28] In the instant case, the determination of the issue of whether Rescue Security may be held liable under the contract will depend upon the Courts finding of negligence on the part of Rescue Security's security guards.
2006-10-25
CARPIO, J.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)[5] and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."[6] These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.[7]
2005-08-31
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Moreover, respondent's right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice[12] considering that the funds used to acquire the 16 moth-balled oil mills came from the coconut levy funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.[13]
2005-06-28
PANGANIBAN, J.
To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence;[20] or 2) executed "whimsically or arbitrarily" in a manner "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined."[21]  What constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction.[22]
2005-04-15
PANGANIBAN, J.
Besides, the taxation power can also be used as an implement for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.[80]  Tax measures are but "enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions"[81] and "clearly imposed for a public purpose."[82]  In recent years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable distribution of wealth.[83]
2004-08-16
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Moreover, respondent's right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice[13] considering that the funds used to acquire the sixteen (16) mothballed oil mills came from the coconut levy funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.[14]
2004-06-15
TINGA, J.
Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave. (Citations omitted)[115] It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence,[116] or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.[117]
2003-04-30
CARPIO MORALES, J.
(2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands.[19]
2003-02-21
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
"Indeed, grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. In one case, this Court ruled that the lower court's resolution was "tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court x x x and unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion."[13]
2003-02-21
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As we have held in Republic vs. PCGG,[28] the decision of the lower court overruled a judicial pronouncement of this Tribunal which obviously constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible by the present petition for certiorari.
2003-02-10
PANGANIBAN, J.
"An aggrieved party is not left without any recourse. Where the findings of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause [are] tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court."[38] Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.[39] It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.[40] The present Petition is one such exception, involving serious allegations of multimillion-dollar bribes and unlawful commissions.
2002-04-03
PANGANIBAN, J.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that "[w]here the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them."[21]