Premium Content

You accessing premium content on FREE trial.

LEONARDO DAVID v. NELSON

This case has been cited 33 times or more.

2015-06-17
PEREZ, J.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the Court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint.[12] Section 1, Rule 70[13] of the Rules of Court requires that in actions for forcible entry, the plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the action is filed any time within one year from the time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies that in such cases, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in section 1, Rule 70 either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession with the RTC.[14]
2015-03-25
PEREZ, J.
We have consistently ruled that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.[14] This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[15]  Failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the appealed decision, order or award final and executory and this deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment,[16] moreso, to entertain the appeal.[17]  The CA, therefore, should not have entertained the appeal filed by Gov. Singson.
2013-07-17
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
And in David v. Cordova:[30]
2012-01-18
SERENO, J.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is "accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court."[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of  who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]
2011-06-22
DEL CASTILLO, J.
"[C]ertiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse." [36]  It is proper only when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party. [37]  In the case at bar, the February 21, 2002 Decision of the trial court was appealable under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court because it completely disposed of respondent-spouses' case against Pag-ibig.  Pag-ibig does not explain why it did not resort to an appeal and allowed the trial court's decision to attain finality.  In fact, the February 21, 2002 Decision was already at the stage of execution when Pag-ibig belatedly resorted to a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari.  Clearly, Pag-ibig lost its right to appeal and tried to remedy the situation by resorting to certiorari.  It is settled, however, that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, "especially if the [party's] own negligence or error in [the] choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse." [38]
2010-07-26
NACHURA, J.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases--forcible entry and unlawful detainer--are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.[14]  The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.[15]  For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property.  Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
2009-10-27
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The character of the property involved, as to whether it is still public land or not, is also of no moment. Even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases. The Court, in David v. Cordova,[24] categorically declared that the land spoken of in Section 1, Rule 70[25] of the Rules of Court includes all kinds of land. The Court applied the well-known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. The Court also stressed that ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. To repeat, the sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.[26] Hence, it does not matter that the land in dispute belongs to the government, and the government did not authorize either the plaintiff or defendant to occupy said land.[27] The issue of possession may still be litigated between the plaintiff and the defendant.
2009-10-02
BRION, J.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.[26] This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[27] Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the appealed decision, order or award final and executory and this deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment,[28] more so, to entertain the appeal.[29]
2009-09-10
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate a tribunal's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.[15] The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of respondent's active participation in the administrative proceedings before the CSC.
2009-06-30
QUISUMBING, J.
As expressly stated in David v. Cordova:[32]
2008-10-15
AZCUNA, J.
As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, time and again, we have emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[26] There is no compelling reason to relax the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client,[27] particularly because petitioner is not entirely blameless.
2008-06-26
CARPIO, J.
In the present case, petitioners chose the wrong mode of appeal. Hence, the instant petition cannot prevail since a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the loss or lapse was an error in petitioners' choice of remedy. We have held in David v. Cordova[35] that:A petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternate or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied)
2008-06-17
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that when the entry of judgment was issued by the NLRC on September 12, 2006 and entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 29, 2006, the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari has not yet lapsed. In fact, when the petition for certiorari was filed on October 13, 2006, the same was still within the reglementary period. It bears stressing that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed "not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution" sought to be annulled.[20]
2008-05-22
TINGA, J,
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which should be threshed out in the DAR.[18] Thus, jurisdiction was rightfully exercised by the MCTC and the RTC.
2008-04-14
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As to the first assigned error, respondents raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in their Comment and/or Opposition to the Petition for Review filed with the HLURB Board of Commissioners.  After participating in all stages of the case before the Regional Field Office of the HLURB, respondents are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging its jurisdiction.  While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised any time, this, however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.[7]
2008-02-26
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As to whether respondents were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, strategy or stealth, the acts of the petitioner in unlawfully entering the subject properties, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. As expressly stated in David v. Cordova[23]:The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.
2007-11-20
TINGA, J.
Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.[28] On this point, the pronouncements in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[29] are enlightening, thus:The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
2007-10-19
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court has held that where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.[48]  Hence, despite allegation by the petitioner that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, this does not negate the fact that the proper remedy should still be a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2007-07-17
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
As explained by the Court in David v. Cordova,[35]
2007-07-10
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[19] Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,[20] certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.[21]
2007-06-19
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied) In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.[29]
2006-10-31
AZCUNA, J.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.[28]
2006-10-16
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Moreover, we perceive a patent error in the mode of appeal elected by petitioner for the purpose of assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals.  One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.[19]  Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion.[20]  In the case at bar, the proper remedy of petitioner VRESCO to dispute the Decision of the appellate court is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which should be instituted within 15 days from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution.[21]  In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently emphasized that after the lapse of the 15-day period to file a petition for Review on Certiorari, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is not, and cannot be, a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.[22]  In the case at bar, the petition was filed 45 days after receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its Motion for Reconsideration, evidently beyond the 15-day period for filing a petition for review on certiorari, hence the period to appeal was lost.  Therefore, the instant petition cannot prevail since a petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, specially if one's error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.[23]
2006-10-11
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The principal issue to be resolved in forcible entry cases is mere physical or material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of the property involved.[20]  Title is not involved.  Thus, in David v. Cordova,[21] the Court explained: The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is -who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
2006-09-19
AZCUNA, J.
Petitioner should not trifle with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting someone else's ownership over the leased property.[31] The proceedings are "only intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved."[32] In fact, the absence of title is not a ground "to withhold relief from the parties x x x."[33] "It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable x x x."[34] "[N]o questions can be raised or decided incidentally tending to defeat the title or right of possession evidenced by the documents introduced"[35] by petitioner.
2006-07-20
CORONA, J.
Where appeal is available, an action for certiorari is improper. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there is no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.[20]
2006-07-20
TINGA, J.
Settled is the rule that a special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.[39] As the Court aptly held in David v. Cordova,[40] to wit:x x x x Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor[e] is grave abuse of discretion.[41]
2006-07-20
TINGA, J.
Settled is the rule that a special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.[39] As the Court aptly held in David v. Cordova,[40] to wit:x x x x Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor[e] is grave abuse of discretion.[41]
2006-05-05
TINGA, J.
It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. The Court has often reminded members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal.[3] Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.[4] Also, generally, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary writ of certiorari since a motion for reconsideration is still considered an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to give an opportunity to the lower court to correct its imputed errors. Generally, only when a motion for reconsideration has been filed and subsequently denied can petitioner avail of the remedy of the writ of certiorari.[5]
2006-02-16
TINGA, J.
[26] David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005, citing Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752 (1918); Joven v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, 2 August 1992, 212 SCRA 700. 
2006-01-25
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.[37]
2005-11-15
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.  In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.[47]  In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.[48]  It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property.[49]  Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself[50] since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.[51]
2005-10-05
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
A petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal (or a petition for review in ejectment case) from a lower court decision. As such, the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the final order of the trial court final and executory.[16] Hence, for all intents and purposes, the RTC Order dated June 9, 1998, which reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 21, 1995, is already final and executory. As such, it becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes.[17]