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PEOPLE v. MARLON DELIM

This case has been cited 31 times or more.

2012-06-25
PERALTA, J.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[136] Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.[137] In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses.[140]
2009-10-12
VELASCO JR., J.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers to proof of collateral facts and circumstances whence the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.[15] It can support a conviction as long as the following requisites prescribed under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are satisfied: Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.¾Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
2007-09-13
GARCIA, J.
Since Marlon, Leon and Ronald were the only ones duly apprehended, said three accused stood trial for the crime.  On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment finding the three guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty.  On January 28, 2003, this Court, on automatic review, affirmed the decision of the trial court but with the modification that the three were only guilty of Homicide.[6]  Marlon, Leon and Ronald are already serving their respective sentences at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City.  The other accused, Manuel Delim, remained at-large up to the present, while herein accused-appellant Norberto Delim, then known as "Robert Delim," was subsequently arrested by the police authorities.
2006-01-25
CALLEJO, SR., J.
In People v. Delim,[12] the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
2005-04-14
CARPIO, J.
To prove that Renato's death is a case of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that he was deliberately killed.[17] Intent to kill can be deduced from the weapons used by the malefactors,
2005-04-06
GARCIA, J.
In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People vs. Delim, [10] the Court en banc categorically stated:If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. (Emphasis supplied).
2004-06-08
PER CURIAM
Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert Agbanlog civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence[43] the award of civil indemnity is proper. However, the actual damages awarded to the heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be modified, considering that the prosecution was able to substantiate only the amount of P18,000.00 as funeral expenses.[44]
2004-04-14
CALLEJO, SR., J.
In People v. Delim,[40] we held, thus:The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.[41]
2004-03-31
CARPIO MORALES, J.
The heirs of the victim are, however, entitled to an award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 which needs no proof other than the victim's death.[33]
2004-02-27
CARPIO MORALES, J.
As to the civil aspect of the case, this Court affirms the award by the trial court of P50,000.00 civil indemnity in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[22] as it does the award of P32,397.00 representing funeral expenses,[23] the incurrence of which was admitted by the defense.[24]
2004-02-18
PANGANIBAN, J.
As to his civil liability, prevailing jurisprudence imposes the amount of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto for homicide.[59] The award of actual damages in the form of hospitalization and burial expenses, which were adequately proved by receipts,[60] is affirmed. Being adequately supported by the evidence on record, the grant of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is also affirmed.
2004-02-13
CALLEJO, SR., J.
We are convinced that based on the evidence on record, the appellants conspired to kill the victim.  There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it.[19] Conspiracy may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted acts and concurrence of sentiments.[20] Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act of all. In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm; and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while in pursuance of a common design are the acts, words and declaration of all.[21]
2004-02-06
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The heirs of the victim Purita Sotero are entitled to P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto;[31] P50,000 as moral damages;[32] P25,000 as exemplary damages;[33] and P25,000 as temperate damages.[34]
2004-02-05
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
The Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as, and by way of, civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Luisito Caparas.  Such an award for civil indemnity is in full accord with prevailing jurisprudence.[38] On the matter of the award for actual damages, the Court modifies the grant of the same and increases it from the amount of P63,850.00, the amount originally awarded by the trial court,[39] to P129,700.00,[40] representing the damages duly receipted and borne by the records. The award for attorney's fees is hereby deleted for lack of basis.
2004-02-05
CALLEJO, SR., J.
First.  The victim sustained 11 hacked wounds and lacerated wounds.[9] The number, nature and location of the victim's wounds belie the petitioner's claim that the said wounds on the victim were inflicted as they dueled with each other.  The protagonists were face to face as they boloed each other.  The petitioner failed to explain to the trial court how the victim sustained injuries on the proximal left posterior lateral left, at the back.[10] The use of a bolo to injure the victim as well as the number and location of the wounds inflicted on the victim are proof of the petitioner's intent to kill and not merely to defend himself.[11] In contrast, the petitioner merely sustained continuous hematoma and six linear abrasions.[12] At the time of the incident, the petitioner was intoxicated and disoriented.  If, as he claimed, the victim hacked him with a bolo, it is incredible that he merely sustained abrasions and contusions, while the victim sustained nine hacked wounds and lacerated wounds on different parts of the body.
2004-01-26
CALLEJO, SR., J.
For one to be criminally liable for a consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide or murder, there must be, on the part of the accused, an intent to kill the victim. Intent to kill is an internal act but may be proved by evidence, inter alia, that the accused used a lethal weapon; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and by the words uttered by the malefactor before, at the time or immediately after the infliction of the injuries on the victim.[36] In this case, the prosecution proved that the appellant intended to kill the victim Ailyn because (a) he used a piece of wood; (b) he struck Ailyn twice on the back and boxed her on the face; (c) he threw her to the ground and dragged her to a grassy area; (d) he left Ailyn all by herself.  There is evidence on record that the injuries sustained by Ailyn were mortal and could have caused her death. She recovered from her injuries in less than 5 days but not more than 9 days.  Furthermore, the crime was qualified by treachery because Ailyn, who was only 7 years old at the time, could not defend herself against the appellant's physical assault.  Hence, the appellant is guilty of attempted murder.
2004-01-21
CARPIO, J.
In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence,[32] civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 should be awarded without need of further proof.  The award of moral damages should be deleted because there is no factual basis for the award.[33]
2004-01-15
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The Court awarded  P144,000.00 for actual damages, P12,000.00 for his lost earnings and P9,326.00 for the burial and wake despite the absence of any documentary evidence to prove the same.  The award shall be deleted.  However, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages for burial and wake expenses.[27] The award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity is in accord with existing jurisprudence.[28] As to the award of moral damages, the same is increased to P50,000.00, conformably to current jurisprudence.[29] The heirs are entitled to P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.[30]
2003-12-10
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity[18] to the heirs of the deceased.  In addition, the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00[19] and the temperate damages in  the amount of P25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of actual damages was offered.[20]
2003-11-24
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The trial court found the testimonies of the private complainants straightforward and unwavering, and despite the opposing counsel's grueling cross-examination, they remained steadfast in their claim that the appellant raped them. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, the calibration of the evidence on record, the credibility and the probative weight of the testimonial evidence of the parties and its conclusions based on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect if not conclusive effprimapriect unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome of the case.[55] After a thorough review of the records, we find no basis to deviate from the trial court's conclusion that the appellant indeed raped his daughters.
2003-11-11
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The petitioner's insistence that he did not intend to kill any of the two victims because even after the latter had been hacked and had fallen to the ground, the petitioner and his brother Pedro Santos, Jr. left the scene, does not hold water. In People v. Delim,[30] this Court held that evidence of intent to kill may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim. In this case, the petitioner used a bolo and inflicted mortal wounds on the victims, which could have caused their deaths were it not for timely medical intervention. Hernandez sustained a complete open fracture on the right ulnar bone which, according to the orthopedic surgeon who attended to him, would have been fatal were it not for the timely medical treatment. The hack wound on Hernandez located on the temporo- parietal region of his head could have caused his death were it not for timely medical treatment. The wound inflicted on De Borja penetrated his right hemidiaphragm as well as the right lobe of his liver. The presence of these wounds, their location and their seriousness would not only negate self- defense; they likewise indicate a determined effort to kill.[31] The petitioner even told his brother Pedro, Jr. after hacking Hernandez and De Borja: "Utol, Jr. alis na tayo, patay na ang mga iyan." Thus:
2003-11-11
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 which needs no proof other than the death of the victim.[53] The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is likewise sustained, pursuant to controlling case law.[54] However, the Court cannot sustain the award of actual damages in the amount of P50,000 considering that only the amount of P7,450 was properly receipted. Nevertheless, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.[55]
2003-10-23
CALLEJO, SR., J.
However, the trial court erred in not convicting the appellants of frustrated homicide as alleged in the Information. The appellants also committed frustrated homicide because as was shown in Far East's statement,[28] he was hit by a hammer. He sustained lacerated wounds on the fronto-temporal bone and on the occipito-parietal area, which could have caused his death were it not for the timely medical intervention. Although there is no direct evidence that the appellants inflicted the said injuries on the victim, the evidence on record shows that the last persons who were with the victim before the latter was abandoned in the grassy area at Barangay San Isidro, Parañaque, were the appellants. The presumption then is that the appellants were the ones who inflicted the injuries on the victim. Considering the location, number and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim, as well as the weapon used to cause the said injuries, the appellants inflicted the injuries on the victim with intent to kill the latter.[29] In fact, appellant Pickrell blurted to Anita after revealing that Far East had been located, "Mother, may pera ka man, patay na ang bata."
2003-10-15
AZCUNA, J.
The aforesaid contradiction does not render Crispin's entire testimony incredible or barren of probative weight, as it refers only to a minor matter that does not touch upon the elements of the crime committed. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. [23] It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and that a person's sense of observation is impaired by many factors. [24] It is significant to add that the witnesses in this case are testifying on an incident that happened more than three years ago.
2003-09-12
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim.  Dwelling, although proven, could not aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information in violation of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[72] However, insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the presence of this aggravating circumstance entitles the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00.[73]
2003-07-31
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of [witnesses] do not render them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a person's sense of observation is impaired by many factors... A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses' credibility nor the veracity of his testimony...Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[26] In her testimony, Rosie Castrence said that she saw the jeep turn turtle in front of their bus.
2003-07-24
PER CURIAM
...findings of facts of' the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court.[45] Finding no grave abuse of discretion nor any misapprehension of facts on the part of the trial court, we accord such findings with utmost respect.
2003-06-10
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
A: `Opo.'     Q: After you were raped, where did you go? A: I returned to the place where there was drinking?     Q: What did you do there? A: I waited for the bottles.[27]   (Emphasis supplied). Appellant belabors on alleged inconsistencies in April's testimony as to whom, Irenea or Erlinda, and when she narrated her ordeal, whether a basketball game was televised on a Saturday, and whether she was indeed raped at 1:00 a.m. of May 5, 1996 since she also testified that she went to sleep on May 4, 1996 and woke up at 7:00 a.m. the next day these alleged contradictions easily dissipate to naught when the testimony of April is considered and calibrated in its entirety and not only based on truncated portions or isolated passages.[28] The true meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his answers thereto.[29]  The whole impression or effect of what had been said or done must be considered and not individual words or phrases alone.[30] It should be noted that April is a mental retardate and, hence, her testimony must be treated with the broadest understanding without, however, in any way sacrificing the quest for truth.
2003-04-30
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the trial court erred in not taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling that attended the killing of Syrel and Exor. In the fairly recent case of People vs. Delim[43], we held as follows:Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime. As this Court held: 'No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of defendant. Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means or execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.
2003-04-03
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Case law has it that qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.[13] For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution is required to prove the following:… (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[14]
2003-04-02
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amount of P75,000 by way of indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to said heirs. This is erroneous. Since the penalty imposed on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity should be only P50,000. The heirs of the victim should also be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.[34]