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ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

This case has been cited 42 times or more.

2016-01-12
SERENO, C.J.
[93] Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 914 (2003).
2015-02-23
SERENO, C.J.
It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public utilities. Considering the foregoing, we find that the petition raises no issue of constitutional import. More particularly, no legislative prerogative, power, or privilege has been impaired. Hence, legislators have no standing to file the instant petition, for they are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.[82] Standing is accorded to them only if there is an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators.[83]
2014-07-08
REYES, J.
"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose."[38]
2014-04-08
MENDOZA, J.
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.[87] In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation but only at a very limited and specific point to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.[88] Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.[89] The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
2014-04-08
MENDOZA, J.
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation."[95]
2014-03-19
MENDOZA, J.
This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.[8] Thus, a lawyer was held to be negligent when he failed to do anything to protect his client's interest after receiving his acceptance fee.[9] In another case,[10] this Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the status of the case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the appropriate actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the sums he received from his client.[11]
2014-01-28
BRION, J.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat.  Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed.  Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II[35] and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.  These provisions read: Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
2013-07-16
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication.[56]  The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[57]
2012-07-17
MENDOZA, J.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.[31] The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
2012-07-17
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.[16] we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,[17] the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one- year bar provision.
2012-03-20
ABAD, J.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
2012-02-28
BRION, J.
"Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.  The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[24]  This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.[25]
2012-02-28
BRION, J.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed."[9] Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision."  Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.
2011-09-14
CARPIO, J.
Intervention is not a matter of right but it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements authorizing intervention.[20] In G.R. No. 193247, the Court of Appeals denied Carbonilla, et al.'s motion for intervention in its 26 February 2009 Resolution on the ground that the case was for collection of unpaid overtime services and thus should be pursued in a separate proceeding against the proper respondents. A reading of the Carbonilla, et al.'s Omnibus Motion[21] supports the ground invoked by the Court of Appeals in denying the motion. The Omnibus Motion states: The said movants-intervenors all held offices or were stationed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport [NAIA] and who have all been rendering overtime services thereat for so many years.
2011-08-16
CARPIO, J.
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative[15] nor misuse of public funds,[16] occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners' locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.[17]
2011-07-05
VELASCO JR., J.
Subsequently, Centennary sold [51] the entire 300 hectares to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO) for PhP 750 million. The latter acquired it for the purpose of developing an industrial complex. [52] As a result, Centennary's TCT No. 292091 was canceled to be replaced by TCT No. 310986 [53] in the name of LIPCO.
2011-07-05
VELASCO JR., J.
The Court will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. [168] In the seminal case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary, the Court explained the concept of lis mota as a requirement of judicial review in this wise: Lis mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review - means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. [169]
2011-03-08
CARPIO, J.
As regards respondent's invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people."[20] Thus, it has been held that "the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."[21] The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
2011-02-15
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.[17]
2011-02-01
VELASCO JR., J.
When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a petitioner needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed with standing.  Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.[20] expounded on this requirement, thus: In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
2010-10-05
CARPIO MORALES, J.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz:  (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]
2010-06-25
CARPIO, J.
First. Petitioner's citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizen's suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.[5] Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised - the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.[6] None of petitioner's allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioner's generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.
2010-04-20
BERSAMIN, J.
In my view, this kind of mindset and the conclusion it inevitably leads to cannot be adopted; the provisions of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation from what the whole contains. To be exact, the Constitution must be read and understood as a whole, reconciling and harmonizing apparently conflicting provisions so that all of them can be given full force and effect,[29] unless the Constitution itself expressly states otherwise.[30]
2010-03-17
BERSAMIN, J.
Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC "to immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution" in the event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.[13]
2009-12-04
CARPIO, J.
We look to the language of the document itself in search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language, as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. Well-settled principles of constitutional construction are also firm guides for interpretation. These principles are reiterated in Francisco v. The House of Representatives,[108] to wit:First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. xxx.
2009-07-14
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On 8 April 2003, respondent filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund of the P202,471.18 OCT it alleged to have erroneously paid in 2001. In a letter[6] dated 4 April 2003, addressed to petitioner, Ma. Stella L. Diaz (Diaz), the Assistant Vice-President for Financial Planning & Analysis of respondent, explained that the claim for refund of respondent was based on its franchise, Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590, which granted it (1) the option to pay either the basic corporate income tax on its annual net taxable income or the two percent franchise tax on its gross revenues, whichever was lower; and (2) the exemption from all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges imposed by any municipal, city, provincial or national authority or government agency, now or in the future, except only real property tax. Also invoking BIR Ruling No. 97-94[7] dated 13 April 1994, Diaz maintained that, other than being liable for basic corporate income tax or the franchise tax, whichever was lower, respondent was clearly exempted from all other taxes, including OCT, by virtue of the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590.
2009-06-16
PUNO, C.J.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.[8] Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.[9] In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[10] An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.[11]
2009-04-16
TINGA, J.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes that a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]
2009-04-02
BRION, J.
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[13]
2008-10-14
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[59] For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,[60] and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.[61] He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[62]
2008-10-14
CARPIO MORALES, J.
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[80] When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.[81]
2008-10-14
CARPIO MORALES, J.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,[20] docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
2008-02-15
PUNO, C.J.
Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioner's legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they raised as to the validity of the "fair warning" issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTC's mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry.[17] It was also stressed that "most of the [television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP."[18]
2007-08-29
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[10]
2006-10-25
CARPIO, J.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.[45] Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
2006-04-20
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[39]
2006-02-27
CARPIO, J.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.[24] Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.[25]
2004-12-15
PUNO, J.
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."[98] Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged.[99]
2004-12-01
PANGANIBAN, J.
Very recently, in Francisco v. The House of Representatives,[33] this Court indeed had the occasion to reiterate the well-settled principles of constitutional construction:"First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. x x x.