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DOMINGO NEYPES v. DEL MUNDO

This case has been cited 43 times or more.

2015-11-10
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;[222] (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;[223] and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes[224] While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure[225] solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."[226]
2015-06-16
CARPIO, J.
This liberal policy, however, is an exception and has its limits. In those rare cases when the Court applied the exception, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.[67] This critical element unfortunately is not genuinely reflected in Rosquita and Villanueva’s respective petitions.
2015-01-27
BERSAMIN, J.
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals;[11] and that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked the submission of a verified declaration; and prays that the declaration attached to the motion for reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule[12] by previously submitting a compact disc (CD) containing the petition for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the assailed decision.
2012-08-23
BERSAMIN, J.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UP's favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[98] viz: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2012-07-18
BERSAMIN, J.
Subsequently, in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[32] where the decisive issue was whether or not the appeal was taken within the reglementary period, with petitioners contending that they had timely filed their notice of appeal based on their submission that the period of appeal should be reckoned from July 22, 1998, the day they had received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration (of the order dismissing their complaint), instead of on March 3, 1998, the day they had received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint, the Court, citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. and Apuyan v. Haldeman, ruled that the receipt by petitioners of the denial of their motion for reconsideration filed against the dismissal of their complaint, which was a final order, started the reckoning point for the filing of their appeal, to wit: Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
2012-01-25
BERSAMIN, J.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[25] by which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit: The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
2011-10-12
SERENO, J.
The MTCC, however, denied the motion on 3 February 2010. Reference was made to Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[10] wherein the appeal period was sought to be standardized, by establishing the rule that a fresh period of 15 days was allowed within which to file a notice of appeal, counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration. The MTCC, however, did not view Neypes as applicable to the case of petitioner. It believed that Neypes applied only to Rules 40, 42, 43 and 45 appeals and not to a Rule 122 appeal, all under the Rules of Court.
2011-04-06
BERSAMIN, J.
NHA's stance might be correct under the pronouncement in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[12] where the Court has allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which an aggrieved party may file the notice of appeal in the RTC, reckoned from the receipt of the order denying said party's motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Although Neypes has been intended to standardize the appeal periods under the Rules of Court, and has been applied retroactively in some cases due to its being a dictum on remedial law, the pronouncement could not now benefit NHA considering that the issue of whether or not the RTC had been guilty of grave abuse of discretion - the precise subject matter of its petition for certiorari - should be determined on the basis of the rules and jurispaidence then prevailing.
2011-02-09
BRION, J.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[5] she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.[6]
2010-08-11
MENDOZA, J.
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[22]
2010-06-29
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Invoking the rule enunciated by this Court in the 2005 case of Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[9] petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration of RD Sampulna's October 16, 2007 Order that she still had a fresh period of fifteen days from her receipt on September 12, 2007 of copy of the September 6, 2007 Order denying her motion for reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision of the RD or until September 27, 2007.  Her motion was denied by Order[10] of November 28, 2007.
2010-04-05
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In accordance with Section 3, Rule 41[63] of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Said period shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[64] the Court had the occasion to clarify the rule regarding the period within which an appeal may be taken should a motion for new trial or reconsideration be filed. Thus: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2009-09-16
VELASCO JR., J.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[15] as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.[16]
2009-08-25
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Furthermore, the RTC Decision dated 30 August 2007, assailed in this Petition, had long become final and executory. Violeta filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof, but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated 8 November 2007. The records of the case reveal that Violeta received a copy of the 8 November 2007 Order on 3 December 2007. Thus, Violeta had 15 days[30] from said date of receipt, or until 18 December 2007, to file a Notice of Appeal. Violeta filed a Notice of Appeal only on 20 May 2008, more than five months after receipt of the RTC Order dated 8 November 2007 denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
2009-08-19
PERALTA, J.
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[5] that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated: To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.[6]
2009-07-23
PERALTA, J.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the "fresh period rule." In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[49] the Court standardized the appeal periods provided in the rules in order to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases. We allowed a fresh period of fifteen days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Neypes is inapplicable to the present case, although procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage; there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure,[50] said retroactive application of procedural rule does not extend to actions that have already become final and executory,[51] like the Order of the trial court in the instant case.
2009-04-07
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Propitious to petitioners is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[39] which the Court promulgated on 14 September 2005, and wherein it laid down the fresh period rule:To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2009-04-07
PERALTA, J.
In the present case, petitioner had already availed of a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. His next remedy is set forth under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court to be counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. Without an appeal, the judgment becomes final upon expiration of the period and execution should necessarily follow.[29] Unfortunately, petitioner failed to avail of the said remedy within the 15-day period and, instead, filed a motion for new trial. The petitioner cannot be allowed to resort to another remedy as a substitute for an appeal.
2008-12-10
QUISUMBING, J.
In the case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court had occasion to settle the uncertainty as regards the reckoning point of the 15-day period to appeal. We held that: ... [A] party litigant may file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration....[20]
2008-10-29
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant is given the full opportunity for a just and proper disposition of his cause.[22]
2008-10-08
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be "cautious about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities."[18] In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al.,[19] we recognized the importance of the facts and issues involved and gave due course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was even filed beyond the reglementary period to do so, thus:We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
2008-09-17
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Petitioners' assertion in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition that (a) the foregoing documents/pleadings were not material to the issues they raised and (b) anyway, the records of the case may be ordered elevated by the CA, cannot excuse them from failing to comply with a requirement of a petition for review under Rule 43. We reiterate here that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process as it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[25] Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.[26] Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[27]
2008-08-06
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[24] promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present Petition was already pending before us.  In Neypes, we pronounced that:To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2008-07-28
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Subsequently, by Decision[20] of June 9, 2006, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed respondent's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 90251. Citing this Court's ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[21] the appellate court held:x x x [T]he [petitioners] had a "fresh period" of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the denial of their motion for reconsideration, or up to September 25, 2004, within which to perfect their appeal. With their payment of docket and other lawful fees on September 20, 2004, the [petitioners] therefore perfected their appeal within the reglementary period.[22] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Hence, the present Petition for Review[23] questioning the dismissal by the 14th Division of the Court of Appeals of their appeal as contrary to prevailing rules and jurisprudence, citing Neypes v. Court of Appeals.[24]
2008-06-25
TINGA, J,
The present Motion for Reconsideration[12] centers on a different line of argument: that following our 2005 decision in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[13] their Notice of Appeal was perfected on time as the full docket fees were paid within fifteen (15) days from their receipt of the RTC's order denying their motion for reconsideration. Neypes has established a new rule whereby an appellant is granted a fresh 15-day period, reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within which to perfect the appeal.
2008-04-16
CORONA, J.
In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order.[12] Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,[13] the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2008-03-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[20] If the Highest Court of the land itself relaxes its rules in the interest of substantive justice, then what more the administrative bodies which exercise quasi-judicial functions? It must be emphasized that the goal of courts and quasi-judicial bodies, above else, must be to render substantial justice to the parties.
2007-11-23
QUISUMBING, J.
Section 5,[25] Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not be allowed.[26] Its filing in the trial court did not toll the running of respondent's period to appeal which began to run from January 4, 2001, when respondent received notice of the trial court's Order of November 29, 2000, denying his first motion for reconsideration.[27] Since respondent had only until January 19, 2001 to appeal,[28] his Notice of Appeal, filed on March 12, 2001, or 67 days after receiving notice of the order of denial, should have been denied for being late.
2007-10-19
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In 2005, pending resolution of herein petition, this rule was amended by the Court in Neypes v. Court Appeals.[55]  The Court held: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2007-10-10
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In 2005, pending resolution of herein petition, the Court amended the Rules of Court on the appeal period in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[17] to wit:To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
2007-08-23
NACHURA, J.
The herein complainants charge Judge Rojas of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust order, because in his August 30, 2006 Order, he declared that the June 15, 2006 Decision was already final and executory when he knew that it was not yet so and that it contravened Neypes v. Court of Appeals[7] which provides for a fresh period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. They claim that Judge Rojas showed manifest bias in directing the contiguous execution of the Decision against Planters Bank, especially when
2007-07-10
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[11] Nevertheless, it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[12]
2007-07-09
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[11] Nevertheless, it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[12]
2007-03-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to re-open a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.[33] In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, this Court has clarified that it is not "oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice."[34]
2007-02-21
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Petitioners' reliance on this Court's power to relax and disregard the application of technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice is misplaced.  The liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice.  In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court declared:In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.  But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.  Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[16] (Emphasis added)
2007-02-02
VELASCO, JR., J.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court stressed that "[s]eldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice"; and also emphasized that the liberal application of the rules is confined to "situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.  But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice (emphasis supplied)."[35]
2006-08-22
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[44] we fixed a uniform period for appeals filed under Rules 40, 42, 43 and 45. Specifically, we set the period to appeal at 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from or, where a motion for new trial or reconsideration is seasonably filed from the said decision or final order, within a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or reconsideration.
2006-08-10
CORONA, J.
However, all is not lost for petitioner. In Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[23] we standardized the appeal period provided in the Rules of Court. In Neypes, we granted a "fresh period" of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.