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PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

This case has been cited 59 times or more.

2016-01-13
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In any case, locus standi being a mere procedural technicality,[20] the Court has, in the exercise of its discretion, relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved as of "transcendental importance" to the public.[21] The Court, through Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano (retired and now deceased), provided the following instructive guides as determinants in determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.[22]
2015-10-21
JARDELEZA, J.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[38] we described a moot and academic case as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value"[39] and discussed that "[g]enerally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness."[40]
2015-07-06
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Although the moot and academic principle admits of certain exceptions,[61] none are applicable in this case.
2015-04-21
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[39]
2015-01-21
CARPIO, J.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH 2014, ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[10]
2015-01-21
LEONEN, J.
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.[22] As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
2014-04-21
VELASCO JR., J.
Basically, a case is said to be moot and/or academic when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."[32]  Thus, the courts "generally decline jurisdiction over the case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness."[33]
2014-04-08
MENDOZA, J.
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,[30] filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,[31] in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
2014-04-08
MENDOZA, J.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[117] the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[118] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
2014-02-18
ABAD, J.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.[138] (Emphasis originally provided)
2014-02-04
PEREZ, J.
A case is deemed moot and academic when, by reason of the occurrence of a supervening event, it ceases to present any justiciable controversy.[60] Since they lack an actual controversy otherwise cognizable by courts, moot cases are, as a rule,
2013-11-19
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American-English origin.[3] Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.[4] This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.[5] While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator's district and constituents.[6] In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.[7] Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.[8]
2013-08-07
VELASCO JR., J.
The unyielding rule is that courts generally decline jurisdiction over cases on the ground of mootness. But as exceptions to this general norm, courts will resolve an issue, otherwise moot and academic, when, inter alia, a compelling legal or constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public[15] or when, as here, the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.[16] Demetria v. Alba added the following related reason:But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.[17]
2012-10-09
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In its Comment With Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo Ante Order, respondent PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the following procedural grounds: (a) a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy because PSALM was not acting as a tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions when it commenced the privatization of AHEPP; (b) the present petition is rendered moot by the issuance of a Notice of Award in favor of K-Water; (c) assuming the petition is not mooted by such contract award, this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy involving a political question, and also because if it were the intent of Congress  to exclude the AHEPP in the privatization of NPC assets, it should have clearly expressed such intent as it did with the Agus and Pulangui power plants under Sec. 47 of the EPIRA; (d) petitioners' lack of standing to question the bidding process for failure to show any injury as a result thereof, while Rep. Walden Bello likewise does not have such legal standing in his capacity as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives as can be gleaned from the rulings in  David v. Arroyo[11] and Philippine Constitutional Association v. Enriquez.[12]
2012-07-03
SERENO, J.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[29] the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance involved in cases that concern restrictive custody, because judicial review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians 'in police power' cases due to the diminution of their basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency."[30] Otherwise, the importance of the high tribunal as the court of last resort would be put to naught, considering the nature of "emergency" cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of the claim that the issue had become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental public importance as an exception, stating: Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito, (b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.
2012-04-24
VELASCO JR., J.
A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,[2] or when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events,[3]  so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.[4] In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.[5]  As a general rule, it is not within Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case.  However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[6] We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus: The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
2012-04-24
MENDOZA, J.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[18]  The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[19]  In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer."[20]  Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[21]  Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]
2012-04-24
SERENO, J.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency.[68] Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.[69]
2012-03-20
ABAD, J.
The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging these are.[5]  This is especially true, said the Court in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities  v.  Secretary of Education,[6] where  the  issues  "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion."  The Court's duty is to steer clear of declaring unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department, given the assumption that it carefully studied those acts and found them consistent with the fundamental law before taking them. "To doubt is to sustain."[7]
2012-02-28
BRION, J.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[26]
2011-12-14
BERSAMIN, J.
However, the application of the moot-and-academic principle is subject to several exceptions already recognized in this jurisdiction. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[73] the Court has declared that the moot-and-academic principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts from resolving cases, because they will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if they find that: (a) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2011-11-15
PEREZ, J.
Certainly, the rule is not set in stone and permits exceptions. Thus, we may choose to decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved; third, the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.[16] None of the foregoing exceptions calling for this Court to exercise jurisdiction obtains in this instance.
2011-09-28
BERSAMIN, J.
The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to render further action upon it superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.[34]This the Court must now do in view of the question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the future.[35]
2011-05-31
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate court's dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed.[41]
2011-04-12
NACHURA, J.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[20]  The second exception attends this case.
2011-02-01
VELASCO JR., J.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."[13]  Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result"[14] of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."[15]  The term "interest" refers to material interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.[16]  The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the validity of a law or international agreement to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[17]
2010-12-07
MENDOZA, J.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.  The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus: Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."  In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."  Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
2010-11-23
NACHURA, J.
Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo[12] illuminate: The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a" citizen" or "taxpayer."
2010-10-19
NACHURA, J.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande's person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[19] is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."
2010-06-22
BRION, J.
The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from suit.  The CA ruled that the President's immunity from suit is a settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.[23]
2010-03-17
BERSAMIN, J.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[54] the Court aptly explains why: Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,[55] where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[56] "In matter of mere public right, however...the people are the real parties...It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan[57] held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."[58]
2010-02-18
VELASCO JR., J.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.[10] x x x
2010-02-16
ABAD, J.
But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is governed by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.'s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the petition.
2009-12-14
DE LEON, JR., J.
As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent "direct injury test" bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality.[47] By invoking "transcendental importance", "paramount public interest", or "far-reaching implications", ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury.[48] In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.[49]
2009-12-01
NACHURA, J.
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.[26]
2009-04-02
VELASCO JR., J.
Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues subject of the respondent Committee's assailed investigation, is no longer sub judice or "before a court or judge for consideration."[13] For by an en banc Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In fine, it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[14] Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the ground of mootness, save in certain exceptional instances,[15] none of which, however, obtains under the premises.