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OPOSA v. FACTORAN

This case has been cited 29 times or more.

2015-12-08
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Oposa v. Factor an, Jr.[42] signaled an even more liberalized policy on locus standi in public suits. In said case, we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We held that such right need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
2015-11-10
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.[191] the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution: The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
2015-07-01
MENDOZA, J.
This authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative jurisdiction over Circuit Registrars was also recognized generally, under Section 47(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987,[39] and specifically, under Rule 11 of Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1993[40] of the OCRG, and the more recent Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2005[41] of the same office, which applies specially to the registration of acts and events concerning the civil status of Muslim Filipinos.
2015-04-21
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.[40] Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[41] they also assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.[42]
2015-04-21
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given ample chance and opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The February 7, 2012 Resolution[22] reads as follows:G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527 (Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.). - The Court Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the resolution dated September 23, 2008 to the following parties and counsel, together with this resolution:
2015-02-03
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Justice Leonen's proposition that environmental cases should not, in general, be litigated via a representative, citizen or class suit is both novel and ground-breaking. However, it is inappropriate to resolve such an important issue in this case, in view of the requisites for the exercise of our power of judicial review, because the matter was not raised by the parties so that the issue was not squarely tackled and fully ventilated. The proposition will entail, as Justice Leonen explains, an abandonment or, at least, a modification of our ruling in the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran.[229] It will also require an amendment or a modification of Section 5 (on citizen suits), Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Hence, it is more appropriate to await a case where such issues and arguments are properly raised by the parties for the consideration of the Court.
2015-02-03
DEL CASTILLO, J.
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC,[9] for the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.[10]
2015-02-03
DEL CASTILLO, J.
On August 27, 2008, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008, expressing the city government's objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay.[15]
2014-11-25
PEREZ, J.
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal has never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks;[127] that the petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere conjectures;[128] and that the possibility that it would be picked by the terrorists is nil given the security measures installed thereat.[129]
2014-09-16
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[13] we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.[14]
2014-09-16
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
"Minors and generations yet unborn" is a category of real party in interest that was first established in Oposa v. Factoran.  In Oposa v. Factoran, this court ruled that the representatives derived their personality to file a suit on behalf of succeeding generations from "intergenerational responsibility."[46]  The case mirrored through jurisprudence the general moral duty of the present generation to ensure the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology by the succeeding generations.[47]
2014-04-08
MENDOZA, J.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.[101] A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[102]
2014-02-18
ABAD, J.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.[7] But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,[8] the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people's computer systems and private documents.
2013-04-17
VELASCO JR., J.
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[18] the right of the people "to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzol's memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to transport were issued by Ruzol to regulate the salvaged forest products found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence, prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the area.[19]
2011-08-16
CARPIO, J.
Petitioners' invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)[48] must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."[49] Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran[50] treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2[51]) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7[52]), are not violated by RA 9522.
2009-12-03
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In the assailed Decision, we reversed the findings of the Court of Appeals. Firstly, the Court of Appeals ruling defies the settled jurisprudence we have mentioned earlier, that a TLA is neither a property nor a property right, and that it does not create a vested right.[82]
2009-11-25
NACHURA, J.
We also find no merit in PWRDC's contention that there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.[39] even assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general public.
2008-12-18
VELASCO JR., J.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
2008-09-16
NACHURA, J.
All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under Section 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment,[30] particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the State.[31] The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."[32]
2006-12-06
TINGA, J.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. We agree with the OSG's position that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its timber license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran[30] that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:
2006-11-29
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We are constrained to disagree. In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in the country's forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.[81] Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[82] where we held:In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
2006-10-23
QUISUMBING, J.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,[12] Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[13] and Section 4[14] of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
2005-12-13
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
We expounded on this matter in the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran,[45]  where we held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.  This right implies, among other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR under the aforequoted Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192.  Moreover:Section 3 (of E. O. No. 192) makes the following statement of policy:
2005-12-13
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
(2)  The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment."[46] (Emphasis ours.) In sum, the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures.  However, although the DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority.  Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular reference to the agency's being subject to law and higher authority, thus:SEC. 2.  Mandate. - (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
2005-04-15
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements.  This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal[8] on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao[11] on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
2004-06-09
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists.[32] The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,[33] we ruled that "a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right." In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.[34] that:"Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution." Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied heavily on Bell vs. Burson[35] wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "once a license is issued, continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the licensees."
2003-07-10
CARPIO, J.
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the environment.[33] Indeed, we have called for the vigorous